526th Armored Infantry Battalion uniform Battle of the bulge

[nchistory]

76th Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge December 18, 1944.

 

My first trip to the ETO is interesting.  I've spent much of my life researching and collecting Rev & Civil War, and most recently WW1 & 2 USMC artifacts, but this is my first trip to the ETO with something US Army.  Can you order archive records for Army like you can Marine Corps?  Also I know nothing of US Army World War II uniforms if anyone has any tips or comments please advise.  Looking for a regimental history as well as file on Bruno.

 

Jacket and photo of S/Sgt Anthony Louis Bruno,

Co. A, 526th Armored Infantry Battalion.  Anthony born to Henry and Concetta Bruno November 29, 1913 a resident of Dorchester, MA was by 1938  employed as a Movie Operator living at 184 Hamilton Street, and member of Massachusetts Order Sons of Italy in America.  He enlisted in the US Army at age 28, Mar 6, 1942.  He was released from the Army December 1, 1945.  His unit the 526 AIB had the distinction on being a 1st responder unit that helped slow down the 1st SS Panzer Division assault at Battle of the Bulge.  His unit at Stavelot established a roadblock, (yet overran) south of the Ambleve River, as the 526th as well as the engineers failed to destroy bridge crossing, but quick thinking with destroying the fuel dump prevented it from falling into the hands of Kampfgruppe Peiper's 1st SS Panzer Division which could have fueled their panzers to the Meuse River.    

 

I wonder why there’s a star on his World War II victory medal?  I’ve seen this on some US Marine Corps victory metals and sometimes it Denotes a special unit. Maybe this star denotes the special troops of the 12th Army group “T” force Who is the 5/26 belonged.

 

12 Hours in Stavelot

Lt John V. PEHOVIC, A Company, 526th Armored Infantry Battalion

My personal feelings have always been that the 12-hour period in Stavelot, from midnight of the 17th of December until 1200 hours on the 18th of December, was a crucial period that ranks in significance with top recorded battles in history. The tragic events that would have occurred are too large to contemplate had the Germans gained access to one of the largest supplies of gasoline in Europe.

The true significance was never disclosed heretofore because nobody took the time and effort to officially record and make the event public. The 526th Armored Infantry Battalion was a comparatively small, separate unit with a secret mission, assigned to the 12th Army Group "T" Force. Consequently, the unit was sheltered and insulated from the usual news media; in fact, its very existence was known to only a relatively few people. Other military units had publicity teams whose purpose was to boost and maintain morale, especially among the folks back home. In contrast, the policy of "T" Force was to downplay our activity - thus no publicity...

The battle at Stavelot erupted with such quick dynamic force that it almost defies description. A full pitched battle developed and was underway as soon as the task force arrived. We knew nothing of the terrain, there were no lines of communication, we had no idea what troops were in the area, nor what this disposition was - we moved into a complete vacuum with no time to evaluate the neither situation nor time to develop a plan of resistance. All orders were conceived and given "on the fly".

I'm sure from the information you already have that you gained a good picture of the situation, nevertheless, I'm taking the liberty to take you back in time when we were first alerted on the 17th of December and narratively carry you forward to approximately noon on the 18th of December when elements of the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry arrived.

When the battalion was alerted on the afternoon of the 17th of December, the information initially received was very sketchy. We were told essentially that there was a major breakthrough by the Germans in the Ardennes, that an American unit had been captured and massacred in the general vicinity of Malmedy and the Battalion was to go to Malmedy. Word was also received that the infamous Skorzeny was given the task to capture Eisenhower thus we were to be on alert for parachutists and also Germans wearing U.S. uniforms and driving U.S. vehicles. At the time the Battalion was billeted in various communities south of Liege.

By late afternoon the companies began assembling. Despite the early darkness and confusing traffic heading westward, the rendezvous was accomplished without any major problems. Considering the conditions facing the Battalion the spirit and morale were exceptionally high. There was frequent stop-and-go movement and meetings among the higher echelons caused numerous changes in plans and strategy. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Carlisle B. Irwin, the Battalion Commander, received orders to send a task force to Stavelot to stem the drive the Germans were mounting in that area. Major Solis, the Battalion Executive Officer, was put in command of the task force. Major Solis requested that I also should be assigned to the team. My initial reaction was disappointment because I wanted to go to Malmedy where I thought all the action was going to take place. How wrong I was.

Captain Sheetz, of the 291st Engineer Battalion, met the task force when it neared Stavelot. As I recall the night was extremely dark, making it exceptionally difficult to move about in the village. I became separated from Major Solis and it took me about 15 minutes to locate him. What I considered impressive about our entrance was the fact that, in spite of the darkness, Captain Mitchell was able to get his troops and vehicles deployed and into position in a relatively short time which was a good thing because almost immediately all hell seemed to break loose.

The situation was very fluid and uncertain. Solis and Mitchell had moved into Captain Sheetz's CP located in a big brick building facing the river and near the bridge. The situation, as Captain Sheetz informed us, was that he had earlier set up two roadblocks across the river, one on the road to Baugnez and the other on the road to Wanne. Little did Sheetz, or any of us for that matter, know that those two outposts were pitted against the onslaught of one of the more famous crack armored divisions which formed the backbone of the German blitzkrieg. Because radio communication had been quickly lost to the Baugnez roadblock, Captain Sheetz sent a two-man patrol in a jeep to reestablish contact. About a half mile beyond the bridge the jeep came under enemy fire and the driver was badly wounded. The other man managed to get out the jeep and was able to return to the command post. That briefing was the last time I saw Captain Sheetz. Thus I am unable to comment about the collaboration between "A" Company and the Engineers.

With Sheetz's information in hand, Captain Mitchell immediately organized a relief to locate and return the wounded man and also to reestablish the roadblock. The wounded man was located; however, the relief force itself quickly came under fire and while trying to extricate itself discovered that the Germans were using American vehicles, and also had already infiltrated into the homes along the sides of the road, and were firing at the vehicles from second floor windows. Radio traffic was extremely heavy and it was difficult to get a clear picture of the situation or to understand the messages because the operators were interfering with each other.

While this tense situation was unfolding a guard brought in a "G.I." that had been found near the CP. We had been alerted earlier that some or Skorzeny's people were being infiltrated and parachuted behind our lines. They reportedly were to try to capture Eisenhower, to disrupt traffic by altering directional traffic signs and in general, raise as much trouble and havoc as possible. In spite of this warning the interrogation of this "G.I." was perfunctorily carried out because we were concerned about the firefight then going on across the river. Because of this distraction his answers did not immediately arouse suspicion. For example, he said he worked for the burgemeister. That should have alerted us because military government was not operational in the area. Then he said he lost his helmet when he started to run when the firing began. (We found out later that the lack of a helmet was one of the features that Skorzeny's men used to distinguish themselves from the American G.I.) He also spoke in broken English. This did not seem strange or unusual to me because I grew up in northern Michigan and Minnesota where many 1st generation Americans spoke broken English. Besides some of the interrogators and translators in "T" Force spoke in broken English.

While the interrogation was going on the situation across the river was becoming more desperate. Consequently, everyone's attention was drawn to that problem and the "G.I." was finally told to get out of the CP and return to his unit. It was not until several days later that it began to register that his answers were questionable and that he could have been one of Skorzeny's agents.

More and more information kept coming in that the Germans were using American vehicles including half-tracks. This information coupled with the fact that the Germans had already infiltrated as far into Stavelot as the bridge, caused Major Solis to direct that all troops be pulled back to the western side of the river and that defenses be beefed up around the bridge. While I'm not certain about the big guns of the tank destroyer platoon, I do know some of "A" Company's anti-tank guns were moved into positions to cover the eastern approaches to the bridge.

It was still fairly dark therefore, to improve visibility of the bridge; some enterprising individuals set on fire some make shift flares from old oil drums, which illuminated the eastern end of the bridge. This created a tremendous lull in the German advance; nevertheless, they soon attempted to get a wheeled vehicle across the bridge. One of the anti-tank guns quickly destroyed the vehicle. The German brought up a tank that towed the wreck off the bridge. A tank next attempted to cross but it was quickly immobilized. The Germans then brought up a monstrously huge Tiger Royal tank, which pulled the wrecked tank from the bridge. The anti-tank guns proved ineffective against the Tiger Royal.

In the meantime, Major Solis had gotten in touch with Battalion Headquarters in Malmedy and had requested that the Battalion assault guns be sent to Stavelot and he also asked for artillery support. By this time it was obvious that the Germans had an overwhelming force and we had nothing that could stop the Tiger Royal tanks

In the early morning light it quickly became apparent that the CP was too vulnerable. Its entrance faced the river and the building would be one of the first to be overrun if the Germans got across. Major Solis ordered us to move to the center of the town.

Major Solis at this time directed me to reconnoiter the area and to get an overall evaluation of our situation. In the town square I ran into Lieutenant Goddard, the commander of the Battalion's Reconnaissance Platoon. It seemed that Major Solis's request for artillery support brought to a head a problem that was confronting all units moving into the Malmedy - Stavelot area. The irony of the situation was not immediately apparent because Stavelot was the army Map Depot yet no one had detailed large-scale maps of the area. The artillery didn't know where to lay down indirect fire because they did not have maps. We did not have appropriate maps to plot the coordinates that we wanted covered. Lieutenant Colonel Irwin ordered Goddard to Stavelot to get the necessary maps.

The situation at the river was very tenuous. No one was aware of anything beyond his immediate area. Consequently, when Goddard arrived he was unable to find anyone who could help him. By sheer luck, we ran into each other and the only reason I was able to help was because the CP had earlier been located in the Map Depot.

By this time it was very light and I knew we couldn't return directly to the old CP because the entrance was under observation and fire of the Germans. I had earlier tried in vain to find an entrance on the west side of the building in order to recover my trench coat, which I had left behind. I figured, however, we could successfully approach the entrance from the south end of the building. Once inside we were faced with another dilemma. The building contained hundreds of thousands of maps but there was no one around who knew the storage system. We finally found an index and thus were able to determine and locate what we needed.

While we were there I searched for my trench coat but could not find it. I did nevertheless find a strange, sturdy, camouflage coat that had a lot of zippered pockets so I appropriated it. (This led to another incident, which I'll later.) Goddard and I retraced our route from the building and he was soon on his way back to Malmedy.

I encountered Major Solis in the town square. We were having difficulty getting information from the elements along the river so I suggested to Major Solis to put a couple of observers with radios up in the church steeple. We were about 100 yards from the church. One would almost think the Germans were listening to our conversations. A German machine gun began to chatter and a bright reddish scar appeared where the bullets smashed into the bricks just beneath the opening at the top of the steeple.

About the same time a lady approached us. She was wearing a steel helmet with a red cross painted on it and she was carrying another steel helmet that was full of carbine ammunition, which she gave to us. Although we did not speak French or German and she did not speak English, she managed to convey the idea that she would help us if we needed medical attention. (I regret that I did not get that lady's name. In 1956 I visited Stavelot and tried to find her in order to thank her for her kindness but I was unsuccessful. If you are aware of this incident or know the lady I would appreciate learning her name.)

Incidentally, that was the last time I saw Major Solis that morning because he wanted me to continue reconnoitering the area. I worked my way around and up the high ground west of town. I encountered stacks of gasoline in five-gallon cans and to my consternation, could not locate any guards. As I started back into Stavelot, I stopped several of our half-tracks heading west. I made them turn around and had them take up positions about half way down the hill along what appeared to be an old roadbed. From this high ground we had a clear view of the riverbank and the machine guns would provide a good base of fire to support the defenders in town. About this time one of the platoons, mounted in their half-tracks, passed me going toward the gas dump so I figured they had been sent there to guard the facility.

After positioning the half-tracks I continued on foot into town when I met Captain Mitchell. After exchanging information on the situation Captain Mitchell continued up the hill in the direction of the gas dump. I, in turn worked my way back to the town square where I expected to find Major Solis. Instead I found only a couple of men of the Engineer Map Depot who said their unit had left without them. They said they understood the order had been given to pull back to the high ground west of Stavelot.

By the time, the road leading to the high ground and the gas dump was under direct observation by the Germans and under continuous small arms fire, which made me feel that the route was badly infiltrated already. I figured the best thing was to move to the southern edge of the village and then move to the high ground. I ordered the men to follow me and as we moved I became acutely aware that we were the only Americans in sight around there. As we progressed we encountered more individuals, however, not of the 526th but rather of units that had pulled out or had become separated from their outfits.

I soon had a sizeable force of about 30 men. As we continued our move it became apparent that the Germans were getting close on our heels so I created three fire teams to help our withdrawal. Our plan was for one team to rapidly fire into the intersections and buildings in the direction of the Germans. The next team would set up about 30 to 50 yards further along our route and the third team would in turn set up beyond the second team. When the first team would start to withdraw, the second team would cover them with fire. The first team would draw back and take up positions beyond the third team.

This tactic proved successful because we noticed the Germans slowed and then finally stopped their advance. We finally drew back to an area where we had some fair cover and concealment in order to move to the high ground. By this time we could hear the ominous clanking and creaking of tanks treads. We had climbed about 100 yards up the hill when three huge Tiger Royal (Mark VI) tanks went by on the road toward Parfondruy or Trois-Ponts. I wanted to continue to observe the enemy but it was soon apparent that the men were anxious to get out of the area so I released them. A couple of men stayed with me.

Soon there was a steady stream of enemy traffic heading south. There was nothing we could do to stop or impede the Germans but we continued to watch them for about 30 minutes. Then we decided to move on. We gained the top of the hill then turned in a northerly direction toward the gas dump where one of the stacks was burning. It appeared that it would not be too much of a problem for German vehicles to bypass the burning stack so I decided to spread the fire. We found that simply shooting into the cans would not ignite them. When the top row of cans was ruptured however, the gas flowed down toward the stack that was burning. The resulting eruptions and explosions were like the infernos of hell turned loose on the countryside. The fires spread back to several more stacks and our fears and concern then was that maybe the entire dump would burn.

During this period we did not see any other military personnel so we started walking. About a mile further on we ran into Captain Mitchell and his men. In a few minutes the lead elements of the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry, arrived. Lieutenant Colonel Frankland, Commander of the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry, after being briefed, had his battalion detrucked and formed into assault formation with a company deployed on each side of the road. These troops were battle-hardened veterans who had been in combat almost continuously from Normandy on. I accompanied the point squad. This caused some raised eyebrows because never before had a 1st Lieutenant accompanied them. I must say I admired their professionalism because we regained the town square very quickly. Hanging onto the town square was another matter because it did not take very long before the Germans dressed in U.S. uniforms and driving American vehicles stormed the town square. To the great credit of Colonel Frankland's men, they quickly recognized the deception and turned back the attacks of the Germans.

The commanding officer of the 117th Infantry had arrived with his staff and took over one of the farmhouses as his command post. About this same time the 526th assault guns that Major Solis had requested arrived on the scene. These guns, as well as "A" Company, were assigned areas of responsibility and integrated into the plans of the 117th Infantry. Major Solis and I stayed with the 117th Infantry until the 19th of December when we returned to our Battalion Headquarters in Malmedy.

I mentioned earlier the incident of my acquiring the overcoat in the Map Storage building. The weather had turned bitterly cold so I wore that "new" overcoat constantly. On the 21st day of December I had to make a trip back to "T" Force Headquarters which was now located west of Liege. When I was getting ready to start my trip back to Malmedy, one of the interrogators said to me, "Lieutenant, your overcoat looks exactly like a German paratrooper's jacket. Everyone is looking for German infiltrators and you might get shot."

We figured that when we vacated the CP in the Map Depot some Germans must have sneaked into the building. One of them apparently took my trench coat and left his behind. When Lieutenant Goddard and I returned to the CP for maps, the Germans were hiding in the building and we were unaware.

In conclusion, let me speak directly concerning Major Solis. He was the overall commander of the 526th Task Force in Stavelot. He had radio communication with the Battalion Headquarters; however, his radio did not mesh with Lieutenant Doherty's Tank Destroyer Platoon nor the engineers. He could communicate with Captain Mitchell's radio but not with the platoon leader's radio.

The battle in Stavelot actually started before we arrived, and before we even knew what the situation was like we had a full-fledged battle underway. During the initial period Major Solis was in the CP (Map Storage Building) because it had a radio. Captain Mitchell soon left to be with his troops and to try to get them settled down. I never did see Major Solis and Captain Mitchell together after that, although I did see both of them at different times in Stavelot. The tank destroyers were towed units that did not lend themselves to the door-to-door type fighting that occurred. Their greatest effectiveness occurred where they could be employed and sited in open areas. The exception was at the bridge where the big guns of the tank destroyers and the more highly mobile anti-tank guns of "A" Company performed outstandingly. I am at a loss concerning the engineers. There was close collaboration initially. I cannot even recall when Captain Sheetz departed. I wish to add that some of the men I gathered together as I was leaving Stavelot did belong to Captain Sheetz's unit.

I wish to add another aspect to this account because I believe it had a profound overall effect. I mentioned that the 526th was a separate unit with a special mission. We were the "fighting" element of "T" Force. The mission of "T" Force was to apprehend and capture specially designated personalities and specially selected building targets. Our companies, in turn, were broken down into highly mobile, hard hitting, target teams that were expected to operate with a lot of autonomy, were expected to be self-sufficient, and capable of independently securing their targets without support, help or detailed supervision. I believe what happened was that when the first fights started, "A" Company personnel subconsciously reverted to their team concept. I believe instead of a single battle occurring, in reality there were about 20 independent fights going on, each superbly interacting without the knowledge or recognition of each other.

When I joined Captain Mitchell and his men beyond the gas dump I was struck by the comparatively few men assembled. (Our Battalion was huge--we were authorized 110% of our authorized TO & E. And each of our squads had the firepower of a platoon of regular infantry.) My initial fear was that we had suffered huge losses. In actuality, we suffered surprisingly few casualties when the intensity of the battle is considered. As the fighting progressed, these target teams disappeared into the bowels of the building or rubble until the battle swept over them and would then resurface. There were many incidents where the same building was occupied by both, "A" Company personnel and Germans.

When compared to the well-disciplined and coordinated action of the highly trained and seasoned veterans of the 30th Infantry Division, the action of the task force might have appeared like the action of a mob out of control. However, to a skilled observer familiar with the training and mission of the 526th, it can only be considered one of the great good fortunes of the war that the 526 AIB was readily available and that this small task force was chosen to go to Stavelot. I strongly believe that no other unit in the army could have done as much as "A" Company, 526th AIB. They valiantly achieved their mission--they slowed the drive of Hitler's famous Leibstandarte until the arrival of the 117th Infantry, and they prevented the gas dump from falling into the hands of the enemy.

I confirm that the 526th AIB, and especially Company "A", while they may bow their heads in deference to other famous units in the Army, they never have to bow in humility.

[nchistory]

[nchistory]

[nchistory]

[nchistory]

 Bruno’s residence at 184 Hamilton St., Dorchester, MA in 1940 

[nchistory]

Stavelot 

[nchistory]

SSgt Bruno wearing the staff Sergeant uniform pictured above in the Company A photo. He is 5th from left. 

[nchistory]

[nchistory]

I understand now that the star applied to victory ribbon stood for having served in combat.

 

[patrick_usmc]

That is a beautiful uniform, and quite a story. Thank you for sharing all of that. It's awesome that you've got a photo of him wearing it and surrounded by other men from his unit. 

 

I've also heard that Marines sometimes put the star on their victory medals to denote that they had seen combat since everybody received one. Your thought that he was in a special unit may have influenced his decision to put the star on the ribbon as well. 

 

Here's a thread about it: 

 

Additionally, Fold3 might have some of the unit history for the 526th. There was that fire that hit the Army records pretty hard, if I remember correctly. You might email the people at Golden Arrow and see if they can help as far as his individual records go. 

 

Thanks for sharing!

 

Patrick

[nchistory]

Patrick thank you for your kind response and information. 

[patches]

Quite a posting, thanks.

[36thIDAlex]

Impressive uniform with lots of great information as well, thanks for sharing

[nchistory]

7 hours ago, patches said:

Quite a posting, thanks.

Thanks Patches

[nchistory]

3 hours ago, 36thIDAlex said:

Impressive uniform with lots of great information as well, thanks for sharing

Thank you 36thIDAlex

[nchistory]

Apparently the University of San Diego has a master thesis on hand,  Battleaxe forward : A history of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion / by Thomas Forster Hanchett.  Wish I could find a copy, seems published, but not sure printed.

[nchistory]

The 526th had a website, but with the death of many members it ceased operation. around 2015.  What wonderful information seems to be lost.  They mention a newsletter "The Pekan" that was full of photos and accounts by members of the unit, not sure why they weren't published???  Seems like they were doing the right things, but not preservation of these accounts.

[nchistory]

What used to be their website..

 

http://donauschwaben-usa.org/526th_aib.htm

[patrick_usmc]

I would try to get to the webmaster. I know there are ways to find out who owns a domain name, so you might try that. I'd imagine there's a veteran's child that's been running the website. They'd probably have that information that you mention - The Pekan and anything else that used to be on the site.

You may also look to see if any of the people mentioned in the posts about reunions are still alive. There may be one or two veterans left that you could reach out to. 

 

I ran into a similar issue with VMB-413. They had a great website, but it ceased operation. Fortunately they also have a Facebook group, so I was able to get in touch with the webmaster, and get access to that information. If I get some free time I'll poke around and see if I can find anything for the 526th. 

 

I bet the University of San Diego Special Collections would be able to scan a copy of that thesis for you if they have one on hand. 

 

Patrick

[nchistory]

19 hours ago, patrick_usmc said:

I would try to get to the webmaster. I know there are ways to find out who owns a domain name, so you might try that. I'd imagine there's a veteran's child that's been running the website. They'd probably have that information that you mention - The Pekan and anything else that used to be on the site.

You may also look to see if any of the people mentioned in the posts about reunions are still alive. There may be one or two veterans left that you could reach out to. 

 

I ran into a similar issue with VMB-413. They had a great website, but it ceased operation. Fortunately they also have a Facebook group, so I was able to get in touch with the webmaster, and get access to that information. If I get some free time I'll poke around and see if I can find anything for the 526th. 

 

I bet the University of San Diego Special Collections would be able to scan a copy of that thesis for you if they have one on hand. 

 

Patrick

I was trying to track down former secretary of 526th AIB, but no luck, looks like in 5 years she got remarried, and disappeared.  No Facebook page either.  Contacted University of San Diego, currently trying to get on interlibrary loan but being out of state, not sure it will work, fingers crossed.  I offered to pay the library to just crack the book and look up Bruno, but no go with Corvid they say.

[Son of 526 AIB vet]

I just came across this as I have recently been looking into my father's military service in WWII. In the photo of the 5 soldiers with drinks in their hands the soldier in the middle is my father, Jack J Mocnik. He was in company A of the 526th AIB. He was Capt. Mitchell's driver. I am interested if anyone knows anything about a Sam Boone (?) who was in same battalion. According to a letter my father received from a George Wendt of the 526th AIB , Boone was executed in March 1945 in Liege Belgium. I recall my father telling me about escorting someone that had allegedly committed a serious offense for a military trial. Regards.