Question about a Vietnam War tactic

[ColdWarRules]

I was reading a few books and diaries about personal experiences in Vietnam and I was very curious about a tactic that was used to find enemy locations when ambushed.

 

I know not all firefights are the same, some areas have more foliage (such as the jungle) and some didn't so some unit's tactics may vary. My question is more centered around combat in the jungles and areas with dense vegetation.

 

How would you find an enemy's location when you're ambushed? I know sound plays a big role along with the flashes of the enemy's guns but what if you couldn't see where the fire is coming from? Was there a system where you regroup and a small group (or even one man) was sent forward just a little bit to locate where the guns are being fired? I know there was a tactic to locate/engage the enemy BEFORE an ambush so I'm guessing a tactic like that while under fire was used?

 

I welcome anyone to respond, Vietnam vets, someone who knows about tactics, etc.

 

Thanks!

 

- Nick

[Sgt_Rock_EasyCo]

• The Green Tracers are usually coming your direction. The red tracers the other direction.
• If you are ambushed, you usually did something wrong with frontal, flank, rear security teams.

1. Before an ambush it is imperative for leadership to recognize the terrain, likely avenues of approach, key terrain features, dominant land features, heavy cover and/or concealment, path and road merges and splits, the enemy in an area (morale, capabilty , likely course of action etc)--> Although I'm not a Vietnam Veteran, I was taught by them how to patrol in jungles. They used Troop Lead Procedures that they wrote out from previous manuals and experiences dating back from Rogers Rangers, through WWI, WWII, Korea and into Vietnam.

• The main point to prevent being ambushed is for leaders to watch the terrain and recognize likely ambush sites--> Avoid them or set up a counter ambush, depending on the mission. Flank security are individuals or small teams that move parallel with but out in front, sides and back of the main body of a patrol. Their job is basically an early warning system to prevent ambushes and to detect the enemy earlier than if they weren't there.

 

Reading about, and learning from LRP, LRRP, Rangers of Vietnam, they also avoided ambushes by taking the difficult and overlooked terrain to their objective. While most people in the world would naturally gravitate downhill, over footpaths, roads, clear fields to get from one place to another; Long Range Recon Groups cannot do so because they are typically smaller. They will often stay off of paths, move painstakingly slow, and will beat the less beaten avenue of approach to their objective (unless speed is of the essence). Slow is safe and you can hear, smell, see, touch, and sometimes even taste the environment around you- While beating a new path through the jungle is slow, sometimes a bit noisier than taking a well worn soft path, it also means that if you're beating your own path, nobody else has ever done so and you will not be ambushed. Taking the unlikely avenue of approach gives your team/unit the possble advantage of a stealthy approach by being undetected. The FSSF of WWII climbed a veritable cliff to obtain and capture a key terrain feature that the Germans wanted to keep- The Germans had decided that the cliff was not traversable so they placed minimal security on it and they paid the price for it. The lesson being, do what the enemy doesn't expect, try to figure out what they would do to you- I successfully predicted enemy movements by asking what the average person would do in their situation, or what would I do in their situation. If it seemed to make sense, then you can usually predict what an enemy will do with great success.

 

Predicting the actions of a highly trained, highly disciplined Special Forces Unit is another story. They are conditioned to do the unexpected, trained to go where others cannot or will not go, and it's a matter of daily occurrence for them. Their standard operating procedure is to do the unexpected. That's what separates our elite forces from some other countries. If a situation dictates that only one course of action can be made (frontal attack) then so be it. But if there's a way around the enemy, and time to get there--- I'm on it!

 

Animal Paths- are legendary avenues of approach. Particularly pigs, deer, or other medium size animals- in the jungle they will develope natural paths from their burrow to food and water. They will take or make small tunnels through the foliage that are sometimes traversable with mimimal trouble by a person that is willing to crawl for a long way in a small space. In Vietnam a legendary Special Forces Soldier and his Chu Hoi (or was it LLDP) scouted an entire enemy campsight using these animal paths. He was not spotted and the site was bombed into kingdom come. He actually was within feet of the enemy as they used well worn human foot paths but he took animal paths burrowed into the overgrowth.

 

Rock

[skautdog]

Nick,

 

Sgt_Rock_EasyCo has described an accurate text book response, especially for LRRP and SF units and if the opportunity were given, the process described would be preferred. H/E, textbooks and war generally don't mesh, especially trying to implement special unit tactics for line grunt units.

 

IN VN. many times line units operated in fragmented platoon and or squad size units. Often companies operated with platoons several clicks apart. When running a platoon and/or squad patrol, having textbook flank security and other tactics just wasn't possible. Also, many times, as much as no one liked it, a mission might have been to recon a path/trail.

 

For clarification, most of the time I was in VN I was not a line grunt platoon leader. I was a Combat Tracker. www.combattrackerteam.org/ Given that our mission was to regain contact we most often did not perform "routine" patrols. H/E, many missions were to operate with a line unit (usually a platoon) in an area suspected to be high enemy activity and/or an area with many trails attempting to make contact.

 

To more directly answer your question, often we didn't, at first, know where all the fire was coming from. Our teams had an SOP for certain members to respond with full auto and others with semi. That way we didn't have a lull in responding fire with everyone emptying a magazine at the same time. That was the SOP. In practice everyone generally responded with full auto to get as much return fire as quickly as possible. Many times in VN the enemy fire was from just a few soldiers so identifying where the fire was coming from became just an extra sense. That was until fire also came from a direction different from the initial enemy attack. We didn't usually withdraw to a predesigned rally point. We assessed the situation and responded as required.

 

The situation in Cambodia was much different with units encountering enemy fire from much larger enemy units.

 

I seem to be rambling and not giving you much specific information. It's just very difficult to explain. Ambush response was as different as there were units on patrol and not every situation was the same. Generally the response was to get as much initial fire on target as possible, then assess the situation and implement fire and maneuver. As Sgt_Rock_EasyCo described, there are certain tactics that are doctrine and units molded those doctrines to fit the terrain, weather, and enemy situation as required to close on the enemy.

 

Ken

[hueytaxi]

There was also a tactic termed "recon by fire". It could be used to attract fire (shoot and see if there is return fire) or in an ambush (shoot and see where the firing stops).

[skautdog]

hueytaxi,

 

Thanks for all you guys did for us on the ground (especially getting us out)!

 

Nick, hueytaxi is absolutely correct. "Recon by fire" was absolutely a make contact technique. Go, stop, fire it up and see what happens. Many times an AC was in the vicinity and could tell ground folks more about what was happening than the folks on the ground could see/know.

 

Ken