Military Lighters - All eras all brands

[Cobra 6 Actual]

[yokota57]

1 minute ago, Cobra 6 Actual said:

First SPACE FORCE I've seen. Thanks for posting!

[Cobra 6 Actual]

Thanks, Yokota57! I didn’t know it’s motto before. Kind of curious, “To Preserve and Protect Space.” I would have thought it would be something like “Defending America by Preserving and Protecting Space.” But, maybe that was too wordy.

[yokota57]

1 minute ago, Cobra 6 Actual said:

Thanks, Yokota57! I didn’t know it’s motto before. Kind of curious, “To Preserve and Protect Space.” I would have thought it would be something like “Defending America by Preserving and Protecting Space.” But, maybe that was too wordy.

I rate this one: Ichi-ban !!!

[mtnman]

21 hours ago, Cobra 6 Actual said:

Cobra, I have never seen the space force emblem but I have heard of it, what an awesome find!

[mtnman]

I did some research on the "Currahee" or "stand alone" (meaning in Cherokee) regiment that W.R. Schroyer was in.  The Lieutenant Colonel R.M. "Spider" Elton who was CO of the unit in 1968 when Schroyer spent the bulk of his tour in Vietnam, did an excellent write up of the time Schroyer was there and the constant mobile strike Force he was a part of that wreaked havoc upon enemy Viet Cong and NVA forces. I will let him do the talking on this one, enjoy the lighter guys and the history that makes the Zippo what it is.

 

 

 

By Lieutenant Col. R. M. Elton "Spider" (above right), 3-506th Infantry

 

The Creation of Task Force 3-506th... 

 

            In early January of 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) assembled its widely scattered elements in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). This consolidation pulled the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry out of IICTZ and left the four provinces of Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, and Lam Dong without any US force. COMUSMACV, decided to create a separate airborne-airmobile battalion task force, under the operational control of Commanding General, First Field Force Vietnam (IFFORCEV), as an economy of force measure for this area. The 3rd Battalion, (Airborne) 506th Infantry (3-506 Infantry) was chosen to become the nucleus of this task force and on 17 January, was moved to Phan Thiet. The force was to have a dual responsibility: short fuze airmobile deployment into the four provinces mentioned and rapid airborne assault any- where in RVN. Specifically, the missions of the task force were:

to conduct all authorized forms of land, sea, and air warfare within its capabilities

to organize and participate in combined operations with Free World Military Forces in the four provinces

to assist Binh Thuan Province with their Rural Development Program, and 

to keep National Route #1 open and maintained from the III CTZ border to Phan Rang.                       

Optimum Configuration

 

The task force (TF) grew to slightly over 2,000 men, and was truly a commander's dream:

3rd Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry: 4 rifle companies

1 Combat Support Company 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery:

3 batteries, 6 ea 105mm howitzers F.S.C.C.

192d Assault Helicopter Company: 21 UHIH, 7 UHIB (gunship)

Delta Battery, 2d Battalion, (AIRBORNE) 320th Artillery: 5 ea M102, 105mm howitzers

Delta Company, 27th Engr Battalion (Cmbt): construction operations in area, Route 1

Forward Support Area, 1st Log Command: furnished all classes of supply

1st Plat, Co A, 69th Armor:

5 ea M 48A3 90mm gun tanks

3rd Plat, Co E (LRRP), 20th Infantry - 6 ea 5 man teams\with equipment

Detachment. 43rd Medical Group:

Clearing station, surgeons, 2 UHIH Medevac aircraft

Detachment. 43rd Signal Battalion:

provided VHF, RTT, SSB communications with IFFV

Destroyer (DD) with Shore Fire Control Party

Air LNO/Forward Air Controllers 2 each

51st Military Intel Detachment:

IPW teams, Radio Research Unit

1st Plat, Battery A, 60th Artillery:  8 ea SP Twin 40mm

4 ea quad 50 cal guns

Operational Methods

 

            The TF generally deployed in coordination with some Free World Forces. This coordination ranged from the use of an RF company as firebase security to an operation involving 2 ARVN Battalions, I ROKA Battalion, I Provisional "Mike" Battalion, and the TF. The combined command worked out areas of operation, fire sup- port coordination, a communication plan and logistic support for each force. The TF conducted their initial assault into a designated tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), either day or night, by helicopter, junk fleet, or on foot. Each rifle company was given an area of operations within the Battalion TAOR. They conducted cloverleaf search or reconnaissance in force operations during the day, and established from three to six ambushes at night. The companies achieved a good measure of security by constant movement and aggressive offensive operations. One of the basic concepts was to try to live as closely as possible like the enemy in his habitat, and then disrupt his activities in his own backyard. Helicopters were not flown into the company locations except during contact. Each man carried 3-4 days of supply in a rucksack, and the companies were resupplied according to a prearranged schedule.

            The TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was established by the combat support company commander and was generally collocated with Battery D, 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery on a hilltop in the mountains. Low ground was only used when there was no commanding terrain available. It was positioned for command and control, emergency resupply, and fire support. The communications was augmented so that the TF Cmdr could talk to HQ, IFFORCEV, in Nha Trang by telephone or radio. Security for the CP was generally shared by US and Vietnamese combined. The US element doubled as a thirty-minute airmobile reaction force to reinforce TF Contacts.  The helicopters simply picked up the troops at the TOC and flew them to the area of contact. Once the reinforcing unit landed, the senior commander on the ground assumed operational control of all elements in the immediate area.

            When emergency missions arose in distant portions of the four province areas where the TF was not operating, the Battalion XO, as dispatched within 24 hours with a sub-task force.  These forces generally consisted of a small control party, a command and control helicopter, necessary troop and gun helicopters, one US rifle company and one US artillery battery. They operated in conjunction with ARVN and RF units. This rapid shifting of combat power often caught VC elements by surprise. One such operation hit elements of the 840 MF Battalion as they were getting ready to attack the district headquarters of Hoa Da in Binh Thuan Province. The task force disrupted the VC attack before it could get rolling, killed thirty-four and captured two. The obvious strain on supply and communications, which these "split" operations created was successfully relieved by ingenious planning and aggressive supervision of the staff officers of the TF.

            All ground elements of the TF used Kit Carson Scouts. Each rifle company was given four to use as a team or separately. The ex-VC proved invaluable in the search, and spotted trail and jungle indications quickly. Many VC surprises were foiled by the plucky little scout. The TF S2 deployed a minimum of five LRRP teams into areas of the battalion Area of Operation that were not covered by the rifle companies. He reorganized the battalion reconnaissance platoon into five teams of six men each for this purpose. They worked with the 3rd platoon, 20th Infantry (LRRP-IFFORCEV) to give the TF a total of ten teams. In one twelve-day operation, forty-two separate LRRP insertions resulted in nineteen contacts of which, twelve were reinforced with an airmobile force. The small teams completely confused the enemy as to the TF intentions and dispositions and furnished outstanding hard intelligence. A captured courier's document indicated that HQ military Region 6, had put up a reward of 5,000 piasters for the capture of one team, dead or alive. In all operations, not a single member was captured; and those few who were killed, were evacuated.

            To support these "free-wheeling" operations, the TF S4 had an enormous task. He established a rear base/forward supply point at a convenient airfield to provide engineer and medical support, helicopter revetments and a refuel and rearm point, Class I and V, and minimum administrative facilities. He worked in close coordination with the S1, S5, Surgeon, and Engineer Company Cmdr. The TF S5 combined the actions of the Sector r S5, Medcap, Psychological Operations Team, Viet. Information Service, Armed Propaganda Teams, and at times, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, to target onto specific towns or hamlet complexes outside the influence of the RD Cadre. These activities complemented adjacent tactical operations, brought GVN influence back into the area, collected information, and helped to root out local VC infrastructure. One operation resulted in the capture of forty-one members of local VC infrastructure.

            These methods of operation exploited the imagination and aggressiveness of the young airborne company commanders and staff officers. In the small combined operations, a great amount of professionalism was required of the young leaders. One such operation involved a US rifle company of two platoons, a section of 4.2 in mortars, a tank platoon, an engineer squad, an RF company and selected Kit Carson Scouts. The young commander's mission was to destroy tunnel and bunker complexes in the hamlet areas in a 10 x 6 km area north of Phan Thiet. At night, he was to establish ambushes. Before daybreak of the 3rd day, he made contact. In four hours time he closed in upon the enemy, utilized naval gunfire to seal escape routes, simultaneously coordinated two TAC air strikes, maneuvered the RF Company with his company and the tanks, and completely destroyed the CI company of the 482nd LF VC Battalion. The action accounted for forty-three VC killed, to include the company commander, and one PW.  US Casualties amounted to only one slightly WIA. In 4 � months, the 'Task Force touched down at their base only twice, for two days each. However, the morale of each man was extremely high. They were busy doing an important job, and they knew it. When they staggered out of the jungle for R&R or CONUS rotation, they were tired, but proud.

            Two visible benefits of these operations improved ARVN offensive operations in that area; open camaraderie developed between US and Vietnamese at all levels. Prior to the formation of the TF, the ARVN and RF units did not conduct many operations in the area. By 1 June, all RF units were conducting operations at least five days a week to include two night operations per unit. The ARVN units were getting into the habit of staying in the Area of Operation for extended operations. The US company commanders reported and wrote citations for numerous acts of individual valor in which ARVN, Montagnard and Kit Carson Scouts saved US lives or performed heroically. The more the units worked together, the more effective the entire effort became. By 1 July 1968, the TF had worked in harmony with all the major Vietnamese Units in the four provinces and had received accolades from the Commanding General, II Corps, General Vinh Loc, and the ARVN 23rd Division Commander, Gen Ahn. COMUSMACV personally credited the TF and its combined operations for neutralizing the activities of the enemy elements in the four provinces, disrupting Headquarters, MR-6, and literally destroying the 842nd VC LF Battalion. The economy-of-force methods more than successfully accomplished the mission. They established a pattern which was being expanded in II CTZ in 1969 and throughout the reminder of the war.

[yokota57]

24 minutes ago, mtnman said:

I did some research on the "Currahee" or "stand alone" (meaning in Cherokee) regiment that W.R. Schroyer was in.  The Lieutenant Colonel R.M. "Spider" Elton who was CO of the unit in 1968 when Schroyer spent the bulk of his tour in Vietnam, did an excellent write up of the time Schroyer was there and the constant mobile strike Force he was a part of that wreaked havoc upon enemy Viet Cong and NVA forces. I will let him do the talking on this one, enjoy the lighter guys and the history that makes the Zippo what it is.

 

 

 

By Lieutenant Col. R. M. Elton "Spider" (above right), 3-506th Infantry

 

The Creation of Task Force 3-506th... 

 

            In early January of 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) assembled its widely scattered elements in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). This consolidation pulled the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry out of IICTZ and left the four provinces of Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, and Lam Dong without any US force. COMUSMACV, decided to create a separate airborne-airmobile battalion task force, under the operational control of Commanding General, First Field Force Vietnam (IFFORCEV), as an economy of force measure for this area. The 3rd Battalion, (Airborne) 506th Infantry (3-506 Infantry) was chosen to become the nucleus of this task force and on 17 January, was moved to Phan Thiet. The force was to have a dual responsibility: short fuze airmobile deployment into the four provinces mentioned and rapid airborne assault any- where in RVN. Specifically, the missions of the task force were:

to conduct all authorized forms of land, sea, and air warfare within its capabilities

to organize and participate in combined operations with Free World Military Forces in the four provinces

to assist Binh Thuan Province with their Rural Development Program, and 

to keep National Route #1 open and maintained from the III CTZ border to Phan Rang.                       

Optimum Configuration

 

The task force (TF) grew to slightly over 2,000 men, and was truly a commander's dream:

3rd Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry: 4 rifle companies

1 Combat Support Company 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery:

3 batteries, 6 ea 105mm howitzers F.S.C.C.

192d Assault Helicopter Company: 21 UHIH, 7 UHIB (gunship)

Delta Battery, 2d Battalion, (AIRBORNE) 320th Artillery: 5 ea M102, 105mm howitzers

Delta Company, 27th Engr Battalion (Cmbt): construction operations in area, Route 1

Forward Support Area, 1st Log Command: furnished all classes of supply

1st Plat, Co A, 69th Armor:

5 ea M 48A3 90mm gun tanks

3rd Plat, Co E (LRRP), 20th Infantry - 6 ea 5 man teams\with equipment

Detachment. 43rd Medical Group:

Clearing station, surgeons, 2 UHIH Medevac aircraft

Detachment. 43rd Signal Battalion:

provided VHF, RTT, SSB communications with IFFV

Destroyer (DD) with Shore Fire Control Party

Air LNO/Forward Air Controllers 2 each

51st Military Intel Detachment:

IPW teams, Radio Research Unit

1st Plat, Battery A, 60th Artillery:  8 ea SP Twin 40mm

4 ea quad 50 cal guns

Operational Methods

 

            The TF generally deployed in coordination with some Free World Forces. This coordination ranged from the use of an RF company as firebase security to an operation involving 2 ARVN Battalions, I ROKA Battalion, I Provisional "Mike" Battalion, and the TF. The combined command worked out areas of operation, fire sup- port coordination, a communication plan and logistic support for each force. The TF conducted their initial assault into a designated tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), either day or night, by helicopter, junk fleet, or on foot. Each rifle company was given an area of operations within the Battalion TAOR. They conducted cloverleaf search or reconnaissance in force operations during the day, and established from three to six ambushes at night. The companies achieved a good measure of security by constant movement and aggressive offensive operations. One of the basic concepts was to try to live as closely as possible like the enemy in his habitat, and then disrupt his activities in his own backyard. Helicopters were not flown into the company locations except during contact. Each man carried 3-4 days of supply in a rucksack, and the companies were resupplied according to a prearranged schedule.

            The TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was established by the combat support company commander and was generally collocated with Battery D, 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery on a hilltop in the mountains. Low ground was only used when there was no commanding terrain available. It was positioned for command and control, emergency resupply, and fire support. The communications was augmented so that the TF Cmdr could talk to HQ, IFFORCEV, in Nha Trang by telephone or radio. Security for the CP was generally shared by US and Vietnamese combined. The US element doubled as a thirty-minute airmobile reaction force to reinforce TF Contacts.  The helicopters simply picked up the troops at the TOC and flew them to the area of contact. Once the reinforcing unit landed, the senior commander on the ground assumed operational control of all elements in the immediate area.

            When emergency missions arose in distant portions of the four province areas where the TF was not operating, the Battalion XO, as dispatched within 24 hours with a sub-task force.  These forces generally consisted of a small control party, a command and control helicopter, necessary troop and gun helicopters, one US rifle company and one US artillery battery. They operated in conjunction with ARVN and RF units. This rapid shifting of combat power often caught VC elements by surprise. One such operation hit elements of the 840 MF Battalion as they were getting ready to attack the district headquarters of Hoa Da in Binh Thuan Province. The task force disrupted the VC attack before it could get rolling, killed thirty-four and captured two. The obvious strain on supply and communications, which these "split" operations created was successfully relieved by ingenious planning and aggressive supervision of the staff officers of the TF.

            All ground elements of the TF used Kit Carson Scouts. Each rifle company was given four to use as a team or separately. The ex-VC proved invaluable in the search, and spotted trail and jungle indications quickly. Many VC surprises were foiled by the plucky little scout. The TF S2 deployed a minimum of five LRRP teams into areas of the battalion Area of Operation that were not covered by the rifle companies. He reorganized the battalion reconnaissance platoon into five teams of six men each for this purpose. They worked with the 3rd platoon, 20th Infantry (LRRP-IFFORCEV) to give the TF a total of ten teams. In one twelve-day operation, forty-two separate LRRP insertions resulted in nineteen contacts of which, twelve were reinforced with an airmobile force. The small teams completely confused the enemy as to the TF intentions and dispositions and furnished outstanding hard intelligence. A captured courier's document indicated that HQ military Region 6, had put up a reward of 5,000 piasters for the capture of one team, dead or alive. In all operations, not a single member was captured; and those few who were killed, were evacuated.

            To support these "free-wheeling" operations, the TF S4 had an enormous task. He established a rear base/forward supply point at a convenient airfield to provide engineer and medical support, helicopter revetments and a refuel and rearm point, Class I and V, and minimum administrative facilities. He worked in close coordination with the S1, S5, Surgeon, and Engineer Company Cmdr. The TF S5 combined the actions of the Sector r S5, Medcap, Psychological Operations Team, Viet. Information Service, Armed Propaganda Teams, and at times, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, to target onto specific towns or hamlet complexes outside the influence of the RD Cadre. These activities complemented adjacent tactical operations, brought GVN influence back into the area, collected information, and helped to root out local VC infrastructure. One operation resulted in the capture of forty-one members of local VC infrastructure.

            These methods of operation exploited the imagination and aggressiveness of the young airborne company commanders and staff officers. In the small combined operations, a great amount of professionalism was required of the young leaders. One such operation involved a US rifle company of two platoons, a section of 4.2 in mortars, a tank platoon, an engineer squad, an RF company and selected Kit Carson Scouts. The young commander's mission was to destroy tunnel and bunker complexes in the hamlet areas in a 10 x 6 km area north of Phan Thiet. At night, he was to establish ambushes. Before daybreak of the 3rd day, he made contact. In four hours time he closed in upon the enemy, utilized naval gunfire to seal escape routes, simultaneously coordinated two TAC air strikes, maneuvered the RF Company with his company and the tanks, and completely destroyed the CI company of the 482nd LF VC Battalion. The action accounted for forty-three VC killed, to include the company commander, and one PW.  US Casualties amounted to only one slightly WIA. In 4 � months, the 'Task Force touched down at their base only twice, for two days each. However, the morale of each man was extremely high. They were busy doing an important job, and they knew it. When they staggered out of the jungle for R&R or CONUS rotation, they were tired, but proud.

            Two visible benefits of these operations improved ARVN offensive operations in that area; open camaraderie developed between US and Vietnamese at all levels. Prior to the formation of the TF, the ARVN and RF units did not conduct many operations in the area. By 1 June, all RF units were conducting operations at least five days a week to include two night operations per unit. The ARVN units were getting into the habit of staying in the Area of Operation for extended operations. The US company commanders reported and wrote citations for numerous acts of individual valor in which ARVN, Montagnard and Kit Carson Scouts saved US lives or performed heroically. The more the units worked together, the more effective the entire effort became. By 1 July 1968, the TF had worked in harmony with all the major Vietnamese Units in the four provinces and had received accolades from the Commanding General, II Corps, General Vinh Loc, and the ARVN 23rd Division Commander, Gen Ahn. COMUSMACV personally credited the TF and its combined operations for neutralizing the activities of the enemy elements in the four provinces, disrupting Headquarters, MR-6, and literally destroying the 842nd VC LF Battalion. The economy-of-force methods more than successfully accomplished the mission. They established a pattern which was being expanded in II CTZ in 1969 and throughout the reminder of the war.

Massive research! Early 1967 case! Ichi-ban!!!

[Cobra 6 Actual]

Beautiful lighter, mtnman! And as Yokota57 noted, Ichi-ban!

[mtnman]

Really appreciate it guys, thanks so much for making it all worthwhile, to share it with my fellow brothers in collecting! 

[yokota57]

21 hours ago, mtnman said:

I did some research on the "Currahee" or "stand alone" (meaning in Cherokee) regiment that W.R. Schroyer was in.  The Lieutenant Colonel R.M. "Spider" Elton who was CO of the unit in 1968 when Schroyer spent the bulk of his tour in Vietnam, did an excellent write up of the time Schroyer was there and the constant mobile strike Force he was a part of that wreaked havoc upon enemy Viet Cong and NVA forces. I will let him do the talking on this one, enjoy the lighter guys and the history that makes the Zippo what it is.

 

 

 

By Lieutenant Col. R. M. Elton "Spider" (above right), 3-506th Infantry

 

The Creation of Task Force 3-506th... 

 

            In early January of 1968, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) assembled its widely scattered elements in I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ). This consolidation pulled the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry out of IICTZ and left the four provinces of Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, and Lam Dong without any US force. COMUSMACV, decided to create a separate airborne-airmobile battalion task force, under the operational control of Commanding General, First Field Force Vietnam (IFFORCEV), as an economy of force measure for this area. The 3rd Battalion, (Airborne) 506th Infantry (3-506 Infantry) was chosen to become the nucleus of this task force and on 17 January, was moved to Phan Thiet. The force was to have a dual responsibility: short fuze airmobile deployment into the four provinces mentioned and rapid airborne assault any- where in RVN. Specifically, the missions of the task force were:

to conduct all authorized forms of land, sea, and air warfare within its capabilities

to organize and participate in combined operations with Free World Military Forces in the four provinces

to assist Binh Thuan Province with their Rural Development Program, and 

to keep National Route #1 open and maintained from the III CTZ border to Phan Rang.                       

Optimum Configuration

 

The task force (TF) grew to slightly over 2,000 men, and was truly a commander's dream:

3rd Battalion (Airborne), 506th Infantry: 4 rifle companies

1 Combat Support Company 5th Battalion, 27th Artillery:

3 batteries, 6 ea 105mm howitzers F.S.C.C.

192d Assault Helicopter Company: 21 UHIH, 7 UHIB (gunship)

Delta Battery, 2d Battalion, (AIRBORNE) 320th Artillery: 5 ea M102, 105mm howitzers

Delta Company, 27th Engr Battalion (Cmbt): construction operations in area, Route 1

Forward Support Area, 1st Log Command: furnished all classes of supply

1st Plat, Co A, 69th Armor:

5 ea M 48A3 90mm gun tanks

3rd Plat, Co E (LRRP), 20th Infantry - 6 ea 5 man teams\with equipment

Detachment. 43rd Medical Group:

Clearing station, surgeons, 2 UHIH Medevac aircraft

Detachment. 43rd Signal Battalion:

provided VHF, RTT, SSB communications with IFFV

Destroyer (DD) with Shore Fire Control Party

Air LNO/Forward Air Controllers 2 each

51st Military Intel Detachment:

IPW teams, Radio Research Unit

1st Plat, Battery A, 60th Artillery:  8 ea SP Twin 40mm

4 ea quad 50 cal guns

Operational Methods

 

            The TF generally deployed in coordination with some Free World Forces. This coordination ranged from the use of an RF company as firebase security to an operation involving 2 ARVN Battalions, I ROKA Battalion, I Provisional "Mike" Battalion, and the TF. The combined command worked out areas of operation, fire sup- port coordination, a communication plan and logistic support for each force. The TF conducted their initial assault into a designated tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), either day or night, by helicopter, junk fleet, or on foot. Each rifle company was given an area of operations within the Battalion TAOR. They conducted cloverleaf search or reconnaissance in force operations during the day, and established from three to six ambushes at night. The companies achieved a good measure of security by constant movement and aggressive offensive operations. One of the basic concepts was to try to live as closely as possible like the enemy in his habitat, and then disrupt his activities in his own backyard. Helicopters were not flown into the company locations except during contact. Each man carried 3-4 days of supply in a rucksack, and the companies were resupplied according to a prearranged schedule.

            The TF Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was established by the combat support company commander and was generally collocated with Battery D, 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery on a hilltop in the mountains. Low ground was only used when there was no commanding terrain available. It was positioned for command and control, emergency resupply, and fire support. The communications was augmented so that the TF Cmdr could talk to HQ, IFFORCEV, in Nha Trang by telephone or radio. Security for the CP was generally shared by US and Vietnamese combined. The US element doubled as a thirty-minute airmobile reaction force to reinforce TF Contacts.  The helicopters simply picked up the troops at the TOC and flew them to the area of contact. Once the reinforcing unit landed, the senior commander on the ground assumed operational control of all elements in the immediate area.

            When emergency missions arose in distant portions of the four province areas where the TF was not operating, the Battalion XO, as dispatched within 24 hours with a sub-task force.  These forces generally consisted of a small control party, a command and control helicopter, necessary troop and gun helicopters, one US rifle company and one US artillery battery. They operated in conjunction with ARVN and RF units. This rapid shifting of combat power often caught VC elements by surprise. One such operation hit elements of the 840 MF Battalion as they were getting ready to attack the district headquarters of Hoa Da in Binh Thuan Province. The task force disrupted the VC attack before it could get rolling, killed thirty-four and captured two. The obvious strain on supply and communications, which these "split" operations created was successfully relieved by ingenious planning and aggressive supervision of the staff officers of the TF.

            All ground elements of the TF used Kit Carson Scouts. Each rifle company was given four to use as a team or separately. The ex-VC proved invaluable in the search, and spotted trail and jungle indications quickly. Many VC surprises were foiled by the plucky little scout. The TF S2 deployed a minimum of five LRRP teams into areas of the battalion Area of Operation that were not covered by the rifle companies. He reorganized the battalion reconnaissance platoon into five teams of six men each for this purpose. They worked with the 3rd platoon, 20th Infantry (LRRP-IFFORCEV) to give the TF a total of ten teams. In one twelve-day operation, forty-two separate LRRP insertions resulted in nineteen contacts of which, twelve were reinforced with an airmobile force. The small teams completely confused the enemy as to the TF intentions and dispositions and furnished outstanding hard intelligence. A captured courier's document indicated that HQ military Region 6, had put up a reward of 5,000 piasters for the capture of one team, dead or alive. In all operations, not a single member was captured; and those few who were killed, were evacuated.

            To support these "free-wheeling" operations, the TF S4 had an enormous task. He established a rear base/forward supply point at a convenient airfield to provide engineer and medical support, helicopter revetments and a refuel and rearm point, Class I and V, and minimum administrative facilities. He worked in close coordination with the S1, S5, Surgeon, and Engineer Company Cmdr. The TF S5 combined the actions of the Sector r S5, Medcap, Psychological Operations Team, Viet. Information Service, Armed Propaganda Teams, and at times, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, to target onto specific towns or hamlet complexes outside the influence of the RD Cadre. These activities complemented adjacent tactical operations, brought GVN influence back into the area, collected information, and helped to root out local VC infrastructure. One operation resulted in the capture of forty-one members of local VC infrastructure.

            These methods of operation exploited the imagination and aggressiveness of the young airborne company commanders and staff officers. In the small combined operations, a great amount of professionalism was required of the young leaders. One such operation involved a US rifle company of two platoons, a section of 4.2 in mortars, a tank platoon, an engineer squad, an RF company and selected Kit Carson Scouts. The young commander's mission was to destroy tunnel and bunker complexes in the hamlet areas in a 10 x 6 km area north of Phan Thiet. At night, he was to establish ambushes. Before daybreak of the 3rd day, he made contact. In four hours time he closed in upon the enemy, utilized naval gunfire to seal escape routes, simultaneously coordinated two TAC air strikes, maneuvered the RF Company with his company and the tanks, and completely destroyed the CI company of the 482nd LF VC Battalion. The action accounted for forty-three VC killed, to include the company commander, and one PW.  US Casualties amounted to only one slightly WIA. In 4 � months, the 'Task Force touched down at their base only twice, for two days each. However, the morale of each man was extremely high. They were busy doing an important job, and they knew it. When they staggered out of the jungle for R&R or CONUS rotation, they were tired, but proud.

            Two visible benefits of these operations improved ARVN offensive operations in that area; open camaraderie developed between US and Vietnamese at all levels. Prior to the formation of the TF, the ARVN and RF units did not conduct many operations in the area. By 1 June, all RF units were conducting operations at least five days a week to include two night operations per unit. The ARVN units were getting into the habit of staying in the Area of Operation for extended operations. The US company commanders reported and wrote citations for numerous acts of individual valor in which ARVN, Montagnard and Kit Carson Scouts saved US lives or performed heroically. The more the units worked together, the more effective the entire effort became. By 1 July 1968, the TF had worked in harmony with all the major Vietnamese Units in the four provinces and had received accolades from the Commanding General, II Corps, General Vinh Loc, and the ARVN 23rd Division Commander, Gen Ahn. COMUSMACV personally credited the TF and its combined operations for neutralizing the activities of the enemy elements in the four provinces, disrupting Headquarters, MR-6, and literally destroying the 842nd VC LF Battalion. The economy-of-force methods more than successfully accomplished the mission. They established a pattern which was being expanded in II CTZ in 1969 and throughout the reminder of the war.

I think this is your soldier.

[mtnman]

2 hours ago, yokota57 said:

I think this is your soldier.

Thanks yokota! Well done sir! He found the actual soldier who fought in Vietnam

[yokota57]

35 minutes ago, mtnman said:

Thanks yokota! Well done sir! He found the actual soldier who fought in Vietnam

He is interred at the Ohio Western Reserve National Cemetary. Seville, Medina County Ohio. RIP

[Cobra 6 Actual]

WWI book-style lighter:

 

[yokota57]

3 hours ago, Cobra 6 Actual said:

WWI book-style lighter:

 

Very cool C6A! I like those ancient lighters! Thanks for posting it.

[Old Marine]

Here are my few.  The bullet is marked FA 36NM.  It may have had a bullet cap, but this is how I found it.

 

The Zippo is a 1994, 50th Anniversary of D-Day. The medal is a 50th Anniversary issued by the French Government.  They all work fine.  You guys have some great lighters.

[Cobra 6 Actual]

Thanks, yokota57. And Old Marine, thanks for posting your lighters. As an aside those 1994 50th Anniversary Zippo’s are starting to get rare, especially if you also have the round tine that would hold it.

 

Also, Old Marine, the lighter you have on the right in your first picture with the wick coming out of the bottom had a unique lighting method: you would pull up on the ball at the top, which would expose the wick, then use the steel to strike the light. In turn that would create a smoldering spark on the wick. When done, you pulled down on the knotted wick at the bottom, which pulled the lit portion of the wick down and into the metal tube. That extinguished it.

[mtnman]

Good afternoon Gentlemen. I want to share with you a lighter from a US Army Air Force and a US Air Force special forces pilot who fought in

one world war and two regional wars over the span of 4 decades. Col. Frederick L Webster Jr. fought as pilot in World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, as a true American of the most dedicated and courageous mettle. This man was the recipient of a Silverstar, bronze Star, Legion of merit with Oakleaf, Vietnamese distinguished service order for gallantry, was deputy commanding officer of his USAF special forces 14th Air Commando Wing and flew with multiple squadrons in that unit in active service in Vietnam where he received his Silver Star and Distinguished Service Order. The air commando special forces units in the US Air Force go back to World War II in operation Thursday, the first aerial invasion behind enemy lines with glider borne troops, landing in unproven and uncleared strips in the jungle AT NIGHT. These men are the best of the best and the finest, most intelligent, strategically and tactically brilliant innovative warriors of the most persevering dedication that the military has to offer. 

Col. Webster led his troops during his time as deputy commanding officer, to the presidential unit citation they received in 68 in Vietnam for the vast diversity of operations the air commandos supported the ground troops with. 

 

Below is the research I compiled and photos on the first lighter I obtained from Col. Webster's estate material. There are 2 more lighters to calm but I need to do a little bit more research before I post those to. The first lighter is obviously a cherished and well used piece of equipment from his time in action which I am humbled greatly and very thankful to alone and steward over carefully and respectfully for a time.

 

Below is the research I compiled and photos on the first lighter I obtained from Col. Webster's estate material. There are 2 more lighters to calm but I need to do a little bit more research before I post those to. The first lighter is obviously a cherished and well used piece of equipment from his time in action which I am humbled greatly and very thankful to alone and steward over carefully and respectfully for a time.

 

Frederick L Webster Jr. Information File

 

The unit was redesignated as the 14th Air Commando Wing and was reactivated at Nha Trang Air Base Republic of Vietnam on 8 March 1966. On 1 August 1968 it was renamed the 14th Special Operations Wing and was the host unit at the base until 30 September 1971. From 15 October 1969 through 30 September 1971 the 14th SOW also operated and conducted missions from Phan Rang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.

 

Operations of this elite unit were myriad. Their capabilities were on the cutting edge of protecting ground troops from the air and  included close and direct air support, interdiction, combat airlift, aerial resupply, visual and photographic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations, psychological warfare (including leaflet dropping and aerial broadcasting), FAC ops (forward air control) and bomber escort, search and rescue, escort for convoy and defoliation operations, flare drops, civic actions, and humanitarian actions.

 

The 14th Air Commando Wing distinguished itself by extraordinary heroism, exceptional gallantry and outstanding performance of duty in action against hostile forces in Southeast Asia from 8 March 1966 to 7 March 1967, earning a Presidential Unit Citation. Flying thousands of different sorties, elements of the Wing caused many enemy casualties and destroyed or damaged more than 8,500 structures, 500 trucks and 60 fuel sites as well as numerous automatic weapon positions, radio stations, bridges and boats.

 

Flying the venerable Douglas C-47 aircraft, one squadron of the Wing helped abort a large number of night hostile operations against friendly forts and hamlets through flare drops and minigun saturation fire. Despite the often heavy and accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, the search and rescue missions of the Wing recovered 91 skilled airmen during this period. In addition, the Wing's psychological warfare missions directly or indirectly influenced the surrender of thousands of enemy soldiers.

 

The wing also provided maintenance support for a number of tenants. The wing trained Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) personnel in AC-119 operations and maintenance, February–August 1971, and transferred some of its AC-119s to the RVNAF, August–September 1971 as part of a phase-down for inactivation.

 

 

 

May 23, 1968

CITATION TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF THE PRESIDENTIAL

UNIT CITATION

TO THE 14TH AIR COMMANDO WING

The 14th Air Commando Wing, United States Air Force distinguished itself by extraordinary heroism, exceptional gallantry and outstanding performance of duty in action against hostile forces in Southeast Asia from 8 March 1966 to 7 March 1967. Flying thousands of widely diversified sorties, elements of the Wing caused many enemy casualties and destroyed or damaged more than 8,500 structures, 500 trucks and 60 fuel sites as well as numerous automatic weapon positions, radio stations, bridges and boats. Flying the venerable C-47 aircraft, one squadron of the Wing helped abort a large number of night hostile operations against friendly forts and hamlets through flare drops and minigun saturation fire. Despite the often heavy and accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, the search and rescue missions of the Wing recovered 91 skilled airmen during this period. In addition, the Wing's psychological warfare missions directly or indirectly influenced the surrender of thousands of enemy soldiers. Through their valorous acts and untiring devotion to mission accomplishment personnel of the Wing have equaled the highest standards of performance in the United States Air Force and their actions reflect credit upon themselves and the armed forces of their country.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

 

Below is some information regarding the development of the AC 47 “Spooky Gunship” or “Puff the Magic Dragon” ultimately into the most active and effective time of its use with the 14th air commando wing and specifically the 3rd and 4th Special Operations Squadrons at Nha Trang Air Base Vietnam. This is where Col. Frederick L Webster Jr. led the 14th Air Commando Wing and his 2 AC 47 special operations squadrons, 3rd and 4th SOS, with 16 AC 47 spooky gunships in each squadron, to levels of success in protecting troops and eliminating the enemy unheard of before.

 

In August 1964, years of fixed-wing gunship experimentation reached a new peak with Project Tailchaser under the direction of Captain John C. Simons. This test involved the conversion of a single Convair C-131B to be capable of firing a single GAU-2/A Minigun at a downward angle out of the left side of the aircraft. Even crude grease pencil crosshairs were quickly discovered to enable a pilot flying in a pylon turn to hit a stationary area target with relative accuracy and ease. The Armament Development and Test Center tested the craft at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, but lack of funding soon suspended the tests. In 1964, Captain Ron W. Terry returned from temporary duty in South Vietnam as part of an Air Force Systems Command team reviewing all aspects of air operations in counter-insurgency warfare, where he had noted the usefulness of C-47s and C-123s orbiting as flare ships during night attacks on fortified hamlets. He received permission to conduct a live-fire test using the C-131 and revived the side-firing gunship program.

 

By October, Terry's team under Project Gunship provided a C-47D, which was converted to a similar standard as the Project Tailchaser aircraft and armed with three miniguns, which were initially mounted on locally fabricated mounts—essentially strapped gun pods intended for fixed-wing aircraft (SUU-11/A) onto a mount allowing them to be fired remotely out the port side. Terry and a testing team arrived at Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, on 2 December 1964, with equipment needed to modify two C-47s. The first test aircraft (43-48579, a C-47B-5-DK mail courier converted to C-47D standard by removal of its superchargers) was ready by 11 December, the second by 15 December, and both were allocated to the 1st Air Commando Squadron for combat testing. The newly dubbed "FC-47" often operated under the radio call sign "Puff". Its primary mission involved protecting villages, hamlets, and personnel from mass attacks by Vietcong (VC) guerrilla units.

 

Puff's first significant success occurred on the night of 23–24 December 1964. An FC-47 arrived over the Special Forces outpost at Tranh Yend in the Mekong Delta just 37 minutes after an air support request, fired 4,500 rounds of ammunition, and broke the VC attack. The FC-47 was then called to support a second outpost at Trung Hung, about 20 miles (32 km) away. The aircraft again blunted the VC attack and forced a retreat. Between 15 and 26 December, all the FC-47's 16 combat sorties were successful. On 8 February 1965, an FC-47 flying over the Bồng Sơn area demonstrated its capabilities in the process of blunting a VC offensive. For over four hours, it fired 20,500 rounds into a VC hilltop position, killing an estimated 300 VC troops.

 

 

Timelapse photo showing tracer rounds visible at night while converging on the target of an AC-47D performing a pylon turn in Saigon in 1968

The early gunship trials were so successful, the second aircraft was returned to the United States early in 1965 to provide crew training. In July 1965, Headquarters USAF ordered TAC to establish an AC-47 squadron. By November 1965, a total of five aircraft were operating with the 4th Air Commando Squadron, activated in August as the first operational unit, and by the end of 1965, a total of 26 had been converted. Training Detachment 8, 1st Air Commando Wing, was subsequently established at Forbes AFB, Kansas. In Operation Big Shoot, the 4th ACS in Vietnam grew to 20 AC-47s (16 aircraft plus four reserves for attrition).

 

The 4th ACS deployed to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam, on 14 November 1965. Now using the call sign Spooky, each of its three 7.62 mm miniguns could selectively fire either 50 or 100 rounds per second.[1] Cruising in an overhead left-hand orbit at 120 knots air speed at an altitude of 3,000 feet (910 m), the gunship could put a bullet or glowing red tracer bullet (every fifth round) into every square yard of a football field-sized target in potentially less than 10 seconds.[2] As long as its 45-flare and 24,000-round basic load of ammunition held out, it could do this intermittently while loitering over the target for hours.

 

In May 1966, the squadron moved north to Nha Trang Air Base to join the newly activated 14th Air Commando Wing. The 3rd Air Commando Squadron was activated at Nha Trang on 5 April 1968 as a second AC-47 squadron, with both squadrons redesignated as Special Operations Squadrons on 1 August 1968. Flights of both squadrons were stationed at bases throughout South Vietnam, and one flight of the 4th SOS served at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base with the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. The work of the two AC-47 squadrons, each with 16 AC-47s flown by aircrews younger than the aircraft they flew, was undoubtedly a key contributor to the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to the 14th Air Commando Wing in June 1968.

 

 

MXU-470/A minigun modules in an AC-47

One of the most publicized battles of the Vietnam War was the Battle of Khe Sanh in early 1968. More than 24,000 tactical and 2,700 B-52 strikes dropped 110,000 tons of ordnance in attacks that averaged over 300 sorties per day. During the two and a half months of combat, fighters were in the air day and night. At night, AC-47 gunships kept up constant fire against enemy troops and provided illumination for the base.[3]

 

The AC-47D gunship should not be confused with a small number of C-47s that were fitted with electronic equipment in the 1950s. Prior to 1962, these aircraft were designated AC-47D. When a new designation system was adopted in 1962, these became EC-47Ds. The original gunships had been designated FC-47D by the USAF, but with protests from fighter pilots, this designation was changed to AC-47D during 1965. Of the 53 aircraft converted to AC-47 configuration, 41 served in Vietnam and 19 were lost to all causes, 12 in combat.[4] Combat reports indicate that no village or hamlet under Spooky protection was ever lost, and a plethora of reports from civilians and military personnel were made about AC-47s coming to the rescue and saving their lives.

 

[mtnman]

These next photos include time lapsed pictures of the AC 47's inaction over Vietnam and give you an idea of what their pattern of fire looks like and the area of annihilation of anything that moves. Also pictured are the miniguns in action with a split photo of those inside the aircraft and those outside. The picture above of the opened portside cockpit with the close-up of the three 7.62 mm Gatling guns with 2 of the barrels sticking out the side Windows and one of the entire gun emplacement shown with the side door of the aircraft open, shows the stick built gun emplacements that were made from scratch in Vietnam by aircraft mechanics and engineers and gunners. Brilliant. Spooky was the official call sign of the AC 47 gunships because of the deep the ethereal light show of death dealing terror that filled the enemy when the engines of the AC 47 were heard overhead..

[yokota57]

5 minutes ago, mtnman said:

These next photos include time lapsed pictures of the AC 47's inaction over Vietnam and give you an idea of what their pattern of fire looks like and the area of annihilation of anything that moves. Also pictured are the miniguns in action with a split photo of those inside the aircraft and those outside. The picture above of the opened portside cockpit with the close-up of the three 7.62 mm Gatling guns with 2 of the barrels sticking out the side Windows and one of the entire gun emplacement shown with the side door of the aircraft open, shows the stick built gun emplacements that were made from scratch in Vietnam by aircraft mechanics and engineers and gunners. Brilliant. Spooky was the official call sign of the AC 47 gunships because of the deep the ethereal light show of death dealing terror that filled the enemy when the engines of the AC 47 were heard overhead..

Great research, great photos. Ichi-ban!

[mtnman]

4 minutes ago, yokota57 said:

Great research, great photos. Ichi-ban!

Thanks so much yokota! I'm really glad that you enjoyed the research because the AC47 gunship saved countless lives and I wanted to do honor to his memory as one of the officers who led this group of incredibly gifted warriors! I look forward to sharing the other two lighters with you after I do a little more research on a contributing factor to his receipt of one of the lighters. Take care my friend. 

[Cobra 6 Actual]

Excellent job, mtnman. I don’t know when the photo of Col. Webster’s tombstone was taken, but if it is recent it means that his wife is still alive: normally in the military cemeteries the spouse’s name as well as dates of birth and death, would be added to the reverse of the tombstone (where the plot number is in your photo) when she is buried.

[mtnman]

7 minutes ago, Cobra 6 Actual said:

Excellent job, mtnman. I don’t know when the photo of Col. Webster’s tombstone was taken, but if it is recent it means that his wife is still alive: normally in the military cemeteries the spouse’s name as well as dates of birth and death, would be added to the reverse of the tombstone (where the plot number is in your photo) when she is buried.

Cobra, thank you so much for adding this incredibly helpful information as always! 

[Tonomachi]

Here is some sort of presentation lighter from General Mark W. Clark during the Korean War when he became Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, in Japan in May of 1952. 

 

 

[Tonomachi]

Here is an oversize USN Seabee lighter that is also a wind up music piece.

 

 

 

[Tonomachi]

I'm not sure of era but here is a 22nd Trooper Carrier Squadron lighter.