Digital Collections - Horrific Audio Recording

[67Rally]

The hazards of serving on the high seas are vastly different from what soldiers face on the ground. However, failures in leadership or with a handful of people can have catastrophic impact on the rest of the unit, regardless of being aboard ship or in a tank battalion. When I served aboard ship, my concerns were never about the enemy threat (even when in a hostile zone and being lit up with enemy anti-ship missile fire control radar) but with shipboard fires or collision.

Navigating channels or straits, in and out of port, or even in open ocean shipping lanes, the threat of collision is serious. Adding to this threat for navy vessels is the close maneuvering of formation steaming or underway replenishment ops where we bring massive warships 120 yards apart while cutting 12-13 knots and pumping fuel.

The USS Porter (DDG-78) suffered severe damage (to the tune of $50M) but incredibly, no one was killed when through a comedy of errors, the Porter cut across the bow of a supertanker.

Pilot house audio up to and including the collision

 

Supertankers and Arleigh Burke destroyers do not mix. Anyone who has stood a bridge or CIC watch directly involved in the the navigation of a ship knows that situations like these are preventable. Plenty of collisions that have occurred in the past provide us with (lessons learned and) simple rules that served to prevent this from happening.

 

One thing I observed in listening to the recording is the absence of calls from CIC making recommendations in avoiding the impending collision. A vigilant CIC team would have seen this and passed urgent recommendations to the bridge team. Perhaps they did but they are just not heard on the tape? Who knows?

 

 

[TRR]

Not a Navy guy, but I see how this is a career ender for any commander. I guess he is lucky no one was injured or killed and at least can live with that. The audio was interesting to listen to, despite not understanding exactly what was going on. Thanks for the perspective and audio.

[Dave]

I've listened to this numerous times now after seeing it on the CDR Salamander blog. Here's what I posted over there...

 

've listened to this several times now, and each time, I can imagine being on the bridge and the chaos that must have been present at the time. What I can't imagine is how the bridge devolved into that chaos, however. I've made a good number of SOH transits and during each, the CO and XO were on the bridge (at a minimum), and in all likelihood the SWO as well as WEPS/CSO or a 2nd tour FPO for force protection oversight. Additionally, CIC would have been fully manned, with a surface plot and navigation team on hand...not to mention a few other watchstanders whose sole jobs were to watch the surface picture, both on radar as well as visually. Finally, all of the lookouts should have been manned up AND all of the FP watches...looking back on old watchbills, this made up for almost a dozen watchstanders topside, all with radio communication to someone on the bridge. So between the CO, XO, FPO, all FP and topside watchsanders, people in CIC watching the surface plot under the supervision of a TAO, the OOD, JOOD (assuming they had one, and they should have...just to watch the surface picture if nothing else), and the CONN...and probably a handful of others, they should have had 20+ people watching and doing contact management (AND, most importantly, managing the people doing the contact management...which they apparently failed to do). So how did that tanker (and not a small one!) just "sneak up" on them? To me, that's unfathomable. Of course, I wasn't there, but I can't wrap my mind around it. No SWO (Senior Watch Officer) worth their salt would have allowed this circus to take place...let alone a competent XO or CO. Listening to the recording, there was an obvious lack of training on the part of the bridge watchstanders. Listen to the standard commands given...or rather, the lack of standard commands. When CDR Arriola started giving rudder orders, what happened to the resounding shout of "CAPTAIN HAS THE CONN!" in the pilothouse, so the Helm and Lee Helm knew who to listen to? Where were the reports from CIC? How about from bright bridge (assuming they had one) or from someone watching their ARPA or FURUNO (or both) repeater(s). (I never served on a later DDG, so they might have had other repeaters, but the fact still remains...) How about the recommendations from NAV when they started to change course and speed to avoid contacts? All...conspicuously missing.

 

I will have to caveat my musings above by the fact that CDR Arriola was my DH when I was a DIVO...and I was always in awe of his abilities as a SWO (Surface Warfare Officer), both in shiphandling and tactically. When I first heard of this incident I couldn't believe it happened to him, as he simply was that good. What went wrong? The answer to that we might never know, and I am certain it was a compilation of many, many factors...but what is obvious from the recording is that the basics weren't done right...and both he and the ship paid for it dearly.

[67Rally]

Dave,

 

Aside from what we both posted, what stands out to me is that EVERY time we transited the SOH, we were in AT LEAST condition 2 (mind you that this was a different era and Iran was the aggressor that we were dealing with during Operation Earnest Will). Rounding the UAE peninsula, the traffic lanes were compressed and there is a heckuva lot of traffic...even at night. Watchstanders need to be on their toes, especially during these transits.

I am betting (though no evidence is presented) that this crew grew complacent to the common occurrence of transiting the strait. They had done this countless times and without realizing it, they took too many things for granted. All of the safeguards that are set in place (Nav plot, CIC, bright bridge, lookouts, OOD, JOOD...heck...even the BMOW...these roles as defined by every navy SOP and manual are tested. The only thing that can undo all of the safeguards is (IMO) complacency.

Sad to see good officers (I can only take your word, Dave) taken down by a cacophony of errors. But, at least no one was seriously injured or killed.