Named BSMv, Battle Of Old Baldy, September 1952.

[CtahhR]

Here is a named Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device to PFC William J. Morrison I picked up and researched a couple of years ago. I found a vast amount of official documentation of the actions surrounding the award - so prepare for a long read.

[CtahhR]

As there was more than one "William J. Morrison" in service during the period of award of this type of BSM, the dog tag that came with it was key. There was only one US21910831.

 

Running the service number through the United States National Archives returns his Purple Heart wound.

It shows that he was an Infantry Private in the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division from Kings, New York (Brooklyn). Wounded whilst in the "North Korea Section".

This is of great assistance when tracking the action that lead to the Bronze Star Medal as it has been confirmed that he was deployed with the 38th Infantry Regiment on 7th September 1952.

[CtahhR]

As I then knew Morrison was active with the 2nd Infantry Division in September 1952, I found the Command Report - I won't post scans of all the pages, just my transcript plus the original maps/photographs. (Typos, etc. are copied from the original report - Highlighted selections relate to the BSMv actions and background)

 

PART I: NARRATIVE SUMMARY
A· Introduction
The Eighth United States Army Korea was composed of three US corps (I, IX and X) and two ROK Corps (I and II). For months this army had defended positions astride the 38th parallel. I US corps defended the left (west) flank sector of' the Army. Adjacent to I US Corps was IX US Corps. (see Map A)
The 1st Marine, 1st British Commonwealth, 3d US Infantry and 2d US Infantry Divisions constituted I US corps.
In July the 2d Infantry Division had moved from IX US corps to I US Corps. There on 18 July it relieved the 45th US Infantry Division on Line JAMESTOWN. Its mission was to occupy and defend that line.
The reserve regiment was the I US Corps reserve and could not be committed without the prior approval of that headquarters.
All units not on Line JAMESTOWN conducted training. In August the mission of the division was enlarged by I US Corps. One battalion of the reserve regiment assisted by a minimum of two companies of the Korean Service corps was to construct and repair defensive installations on Line WYOMING. (see Map B )
During the months of July and August three noteworthy events occured in the 2d Division zone. The first was the loss and subsequent recapture of OLD BALDY (Hill 266), an outpost in the left regimental sector. The second was the annual Korean rainy season. The third event was the relief of the 23d Infantry by the 38th Infantry on 19 August.
The commanding officers and dispositions of the component units of the 2d Division were as follows:
Headquarters Capt. Wilbur R. Coleman
Headquarters Company Capt. Charles W. Detert
2d Division Band WOJG Ray O. Mccune
2d Signal Company Lt. Patrick O'Donnell
2d Military Police Company Capt. E. E. Keller
702 Ordnance Company Lt. Doyle
2d Quartermaster Company Lt. Ben F. Wallace
2d Replacement Company Capt. A. J. Nowak
2d Reconnaissance Company Capt. Nils F. Hallstrom
72d Tank Battalion Lt-Co.l A. R. Cheek
2d Medical Battalion Capt. Vernon L. Cotterman
2d Engineer Combat Battalion Maj. Fred B. Waters
9th Infantry Regiment Col. Maurice D. Stratta
23d Infantry Regiment Col. Joseph W. Stillwell
38th Infantry Regiment Lt-Co.l William F. Kernan (1-23)
Col. A. W. Stuart (24-30)
2d Division Artillery Brig-Gen. Thomas M. Watlington

The commanding officers and dispositions of major tactical units
attached to the division were as follows:
French Battalion Lt-Col. Francois Borreill
Netherlands Detachment Lt-Col. Cornelius Schilpeoord
Thailand Battalion Maj. Kriangsak Chomanan

During this five week period (26 July - 31 August) a total of thirty inches of rainfall was recorded. As a result of this deluge surface water washed out or damaged roads, caused 375 bunkers to collapse, destroyed, damaged and weakened bridges, destroyed communications trenches and dislocated mines. As the period closed all units of the division were exerting maximum effort to repair the damage.
B. NARRATIVE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS
1 - 18 September
As the period opened on 1 September the 2d Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map B·
Upon arrival of the 2d Division in the CHORWON sector, the 38th Infantry became the I US Corps reserve. For one month it trained and readied its equipment. During the period 17 - 20 August it relieved the 23d Infantry.
The 23d in its turn became the corps reserve and commenced a four week training cycle.
Early in the month plans were made to effect the relief of the 9th Infantry by the 23d Infantry during the period 18 - 21 September. On 11 September the 23d underwent a Combat Readiness Test to determine the results of the reserve period training program and the amount of administrative improvement achieved. The general and special staffs assured General Fry that the regiment was in excellent condition.
Operations Order Number 45 was approved and issued 12 September. The relief was to commence 18 September and was to be completed prior to 0600 hours on the 21st. The 9th Infantry was ordered to occupy Line WYOMING with one battalion. This battalion was to be supported by a minimum of two companies of Korean Service Corps troops. Its mission was to continue construction on the line. The remainder of the regiment would conduct a maximum amount of training in camp INDIANHEAD.
As can be seen on the map each front line regiment occupied two lines: the outpost line of resistance and the main line of resistance.
The outpost line consisted of a series of isolated strong points across the division front. Units manning the outposts were furnished by the battalions on the main line of resistance. Reserve battalions remained intact in assembly areas.
Within the division sector, hill mass 477 (3233) - 487 (3433) was the key terrain feature. Located in the 9th Infantry's zone, it dominated the entire area to the north and to the south. Leading into the division defenses were many avenues of approach. The most dangerous of these were the CHORWON - T'OSAN corridor (1140-1334), the ORIJONG (3037) - CHU'TOSO (3036) - TOKSAN-NI (3234) Corridor, and the corridor leading south east from Hill 265 (2635) and extending into the division sector along road 2833 - 3032. Guarding approaches into the sector were Hill 266 (2532) nicknamed OLD BALDY and Hill 191 (ARSENAL) and EERIE (2935). These hills had been taken recently from the enemy by UN raiding activities.
Repeated enemy reconaissance and combat patrols gave the CCF troops much of the information they needed concerning our outpost and main line positions.
It was estimated that the enemy had six infantry battalions on line facing the division; that he could launch a limited attack with eight battalions

at any time; that he could reinforce such an attack with eleven battalions within six hours, and with twelve additional battalions within twenty-four hours; and that he could support such attacks with abundant artillery and mortar fires. He was expected to launch repeated attacks to regain OLD BALDY, ARSENAL, and EERIE. He could attain very easily a manpower superiority of 3 to 1.
This estimate was confirmed by a TWX on 7 September. This message from the Commanding General I US Corps stated in part "that the enemy may attempt to seize and bold certain key terrain features along I Corps Front. Among these points are those terrain features over which there was extensive disagreement during the negotiations for the present line of demarcation, an example being Hill 266 (BALDY) 255321. Certain other points in which the enemy has manifested interest by his actions are Hills 191, 200 and EERIE (2935), Hill 117 (2123), KELLY (197223)......."
The 38th Infantry had already inaugurated an extensive program for the increased defensive strength of BALDY, ARSENAL and EERIE. The commanding General and the Assistant Division Commander constantly visited the units defending these hills.
The enemy proved to be extremely sensitive to the attempted improvement and rehabilitation of the defenses on BALDY. At first, soldiers attempted to erect double apron fences on the forward slopes. Fire from the Chinese prevented these. An alternate solution, however, was successful for a short period. Knife rests were constructed and barbed wire attached to them.
These were carried to the crest of the outpost positions during daylight. During the hours of darkness, work parties would carry them to positions on the forward slope and anchor them. When the enemy became aware of this, he commenced an extensive program of harrassing and interdicting fire. progress then slowed.
At the same time they were erecting barriers, troops on the outpost repaired and strengthened previously damaged fighting bunkers and reassembled prefabricated ''Abe Lincoln" fighting bunkers on the hill. communications trenches were deepened and tank positions were dozed by the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion. This improvement was also hindered by the Chinese artillery and mortar fire.

18 September (see situation map preceding patrols summary)
The tempo or the fire against troops on BALDY began to quicken on the 16th. From 16 - 18 September the fire against our troops on BALDY steadily became heavier and heavier. Coincident with this increase was the increase in the number of observed enemy tanks and recoilless rifles firing at the hill.
As the firing became heavier on BALDY adjacent defensive positions were taken under enemy fire.
During the four hour period 0935 to 1305 hours on the 18th, 400 shells fell on BALDY, 100 on PORK CHOP and 85 on WESTVIEW. The increase continued.
In the one hour period 1750 - 1850, 200 rounds landed on BALDY. The climax was reached in the next ten minutes when 1,000 shells dropped on BALDY and from 300 - 500 on PORK CHOP. All indications pointed to the attack that was about to be launched. All troops were alerted.
The enemy followed swiftly behind their final preparatory fires.
Immediately after the fires were lifted and shifted to other targets in the regimental sector, Chinese were in the defensive positions of both outposts.
An estimated two enemy companies assaulted BALDY from the front (North) and from the flank (East). The coordinated assault was successful. The shock of the preparatory fires and the surprise gained by the fast moving Chinese troops were both to their advantage. Within forty minutes after the assault they had control of the hill. Elements of K Company retained control of isolated portions of the position but the enemy was dominant. one of his first actions was to establish a platoon blocking force in the approach from the east.
At this time (1940 hours) the company commander requested VT and 'quad .50' fire on his positions. Five minutes later communication was lost with the remaining defenders. It was never reestablished.
The assault against the platoon of Company B on PORK CHOP was also a coordinated frontal (North) and flank (West) attack. Here, too, surprise achieved success. After the first few moments of hand-to-hand combat in the trenches a handful of our troops retained control of but a small portion of the position. Communications were better, however, with PORK CHOP. Radio contact was maintained between the company commander on the hill and the company command post.
The action on PORK CHOP appeared to be a diversionary raid. By 2330 hours the enemy had completely swept the area, evacuated their dead and wounded and had withdrawn. A platoon was dispatched to reinforce the position; it reached the top of PORK CHOP without encountering the enemy.
As previously stated, all troops had been alerted prior to the enemy's assault. When the commanding officer, company K requested fire on his positions at 1940 hours, the regimental commander ordered a company sent forward from the reserve battalion. Company E was selected. Its mission (less one platoon) was to occupy a previously reconnoitered blocking position at 266321. one platoon was to continue forward with the mission of establishing contact with the enemy.
This position was occupied as a precaution against enemy exploitation.
While Company E was moving forward to its positions, a platoon from Company L was brought forward, briefed and at 2200 hours was sent across Check Point Easy to BALDY. Its mission was to make contact with whatever force was on the hill. The patrol moved cautiously toward its objective.
BY 2300 hours the only firing was that of 'quad .50's' firing over the hill. The enemy had complete control. The situation remained vague and no movement could be seen on BALDY.
At midnight company E (minus one platoon) occupied its position and one platoon continued to BUCK'S BARN. No information had been received from the Company L patrol.
19 September
About 0230 hours firefights broke out on both east and west slopes. The platoon from Company E had passed BUCK'S BARN and while proceeding up the communication trench was taken under fire by the enemy blocking force. The company L platoon had become involved with an unknown number of enemy and was being subjected to both artillery and mortar fire.

 

These firefights continued sporadically throughout the night. Neither platoon was able to advance. At 0600 the regimental commander decided to place Company G in the positions occupied by Company L and then reorganize the scattered 3d Battalion. The platoon of Company E had been forced to withdraw and had joined its parent unit. The L Company platoon remained in its position on the west slope. Company G relieved Company L by 0800 hours. At noon Company L (minus one platoon) together with elements of Company K, elements of Company E and a platoon of tanks made an unsuccessful counterattack.
The Commanding General, I US Corps, ordered that the attack to recapture the hill coincide with an attack in the 2d Infantry Division zone. The Chinese had captured KELLY Hill (197223) the previous night as well as BALDY.
Ultimately it was decided that the time of the attack would be 2045 hours

20 September.
The plan formulated by the commanding officer, 2d Battalion followed the plan successfully used by the 23d Infantry in July when it recaptured BALDY.
Company F would attack up the right (East) finger while Company G attacked up the left (West) finger. The attack would be non-illuminated and non-supported. The other two battalions on the right would make demonstrations. The situation on the 19th was as follows: the 2d Battalion was preparing for the attack the next night; Company G was committed, Company E in the blocking position was disorganized and company F was in the 2d Battalion assembly area. It would. be necessary to replace both Companies G and E. The 23d Infantry and the 9th Infantry were in the middle of a relief. Troops would have to be obtained either from divisional units or from battalions of the 38th Infantry on Line JAMESTOWN.
General Fry's decision was to attach the 2d Reconaissance company and one platoon of Company C, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion to the 38th Infantry.
After the attack the position would have to be reorganized and almost entirely reconstructed. The regimental reserve would have to be reconstructed.
The equivalent of one platoon remained of Company E. Companies K and L were also depleted.
The relief of the 9th Infantry would be completed the night of 21-22 September. Prior to that time the 1st and 3d Battalions would be in the reserve area. The 2d Battalion would be occupying and reconstructing Line WYOMING. After the night of 21-22 September the 1st, 3d and Thailand Battalions would be in the reserve area. permission was requested and received from the Commanding General, I US Corps to utilize the 2d Battalion on Line JAMESTOWN for the minimum time necessary for the 38th Infantry to reorganize.
Plans were made for the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry; to relieve the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion would then relieve the 2d and 3d Battalions (less Company I) as soon as possible. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry would be relieved as soon as the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry was reorganized. These plans would allow the 1st Battalion to concentrate its efforts on the reconstruction of the positions on the hill, permit the reconstruction of the regimental reserve, and give the 2d and 3d Battalions full opportunity to reorganize. As the work load lessened in the BALDY area the 1st Battalion would relieve the 2d Reconaissance Company and Company I. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry would then be relieved by the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry and it would return to Line WYOMING.
During the day artillery and air strikes were directed at a 11 known enemy installations in the immediate vicinity of BALDY. From 0700 - 1800 hours eighteen air strikes were directed at lucrative targets with excellent results.
By 2100 hours both companies G and I had been relieved.
A platoon patrol from I company departed at 2330 hours. It was to contact the enemy on BALDY.
20 September
At 0600 hours the patrol made its first contact with the enemy at 255322.
The enemy withdrew and the patrol continued. Three hours later it reached the fifth bunker where it again made contact. The platoon remained in this position until Company G passed it that night.
During the day ten air strikes were again directed against targets in the immediate vicinity of BALDY. Three tanks from vantage points fired all day at enemy positions on the hill.

At 2045 hours the two companies crossed the line of departure. The deomonstrations proceeded as scheduled. Within a half hour Company G passed through the Company I patrol and Company F was moving against light resistance; the 2d Battalion requested that the M-16's in the 1st and Netherlands sectors lift their fires as the advancing troops were about to mask them.
For the next hour both companies moved slowly but without opposition.
Two platoons of Company G occupied their objective. The company had received no casualties.
At 2330 hours Company F was (above 257324) receiving heavy artillery and mortar fire. The incoming fire stalled Company F and Company E was ordered to reinforce it. At the same time the outpost on PORK CHOP observed enemy troops believed to be withdrawing from BALDY. Mortar, artillery and automatic weapons fire was placed on them.
21 September
Company F made no advance while Company E was moving forward to join it.
At 0145 hours when company E did join, however, the combined companies began to move forward. Wire communications from battalion headquarters to Company G was good but there was no radio contact; the opposite was true for Company F.
Companies E and F continued to advance against light resistance; the number of incoming rounds had decreased considerably. At 0615 hours they joined Company G on the objective.
The previously conceived plan for the reorganization of the 38th Infantry was placed into effect. It was executed without difficulty and on 27 September the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry returned to Line WYOMING and the 2d Reconaissance Company reverted to division control.
The rehabilitation of BALDY and the T-BONE, however, was progressing slowly.
on 28 September General Fry ordered that Company C, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion be attached to the 38th Infantry. Operations Instructions 159 stipulated that one platoon would be utilized on the T-BONE and that the company (minus) would be employed on BALDY· The mission of the company was to assist in the construction and improvement of obstacles and field fortifications.
At 1800 hours 24 September G3, I US corps passed a warning order to G3, 2d Division. one US battalion was to move to KIMPO PENINSULA (BS8774). There it would relieve the 1st battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division. Its missions would be to conduct training, provide security for a designated sector and prepare plans (in coordination with the commanding Officer, KIMPO Provisional Regiment) for commitment in an operational role on KIMPO PENINSULA. The battalion would remain under 2d Division control, would be committed by order of I US corps only and would be attached to the 1st US Marine Division for Class I and III supplies only. The relief was to be completed not later than 1200 hours 26 September. G3, I Corps stated that the battalion would remain there indefinitely.
The commanding Officer, 9th Infantry selected the 1st Battalion to make the move.
BY 2000 hours the movement plan had been prepared, approved, and coordinated with I US Corps Transportation Officer. Rolling stock had been obtained. The advance party would depart by vehicle the next morning (25 September) at 0800 hours. The truck convoy would follow at 1000 hours. Troops would move by rail to YONGDUNG-PO (CS1554). There they would be met by trucks obtained by a member of the 2d Division Transportation section.
The 1st Battalion assumed responsibility for the sector at 261200 September as ordered.
The reason for the move of the 1st Battalion was learned on 29 September when another commitment of the reserve regiment was ordered. The 1st ROK Division would relieve the 3d US Infantry Division in its sector prior to 0600 hours 1 October. The 15th Infantry Regiment (minus), 3d Infantry Division which provided security for CAMP CASEY (CS3198) would be relieved by the 9th Infantry on 1 October.
On 30 September elements of the 3d Battalion assumed responsibility for the security of FTC #1 and the 608th AC & W Radar station at CAMP CASEY. The remainder of the regiment (less 1st Battalion) was preparing to join them there.

A summary of the month's operations would not be complete without reference to patrol activities. Except for the BALDY engagement, patrols provided the only contacts with the enemy. Brief accounts of noteworthy patrols are attached to this report.

SUMMARY OF MATERIAL LOSSES
A summary of our losses in material in the operation at BALDY include the following major items: 1 M-39, 10 IMG's, 31 BAR's, 2-60 mm mortars, 5 cal .50 MG's, 2-57 mm recoilless rifles, 5-3.5" rocket launchers, 18 ammunition carrying bags, 5 flame throwers, 23 compasses, 3 cal .30 MG's (1917), 15 SCR 300's, 18 SCR 536's, 29 SE-8's, 40 TS 10's, 3 SB-18's, 23 CE-11's, 12 DR-8's, 18 TL-33's, 3 AP-50's, and 1 SE-11.

SUMMARY OF ENEMY CASUALTIES
A summary of damage done to the enemy is restricted to casualties.
Itemization of other damage is contained in Periodic Intelligence Reports.


.......................Total September...BALDY
Counted Killed..............182............149
Estimated Killed...........1445............442
Estimated Wounded......2375...........679
................................3002..........1270

ARTILLERY SUMMARY
During the initial phases of the attacks on BALDY communication was lost with the forward observer there. Adjacent observation posts and liaison officers maintained direct artillery support for our troops on the hill. Additional radios and two forward observer parties were placed in immediate reserve as replacements.
To deal effectively with the coordinated attacks (BALDY and PORK CHOP), the 37th Field Artillery Battalion (general support) was made available to the liaison officer to the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry which defended PORK CHOP. The 38th Field Artillery Battalion was then free to concentrate its fire on BALDY· From 1940 - 2040 hours 18 September Division Artillery provided illumination of the battlefield. This ceased when a flare ship arrived.
For the attack of the 2d Battalion to capture BALDY, division artillery carefully planned, scheduled and coordinated fires with supporting fires from I US Corps and the 3d US Infantry Division. During the night of 20-21 September these fires were executed. In addition to these fires I US Corps Artillery fired counter-mortar missions at the request of division artillery. Again illumination was provided until a flare ship arrived.
During the month every patrol that left our main line of resistance or outpost line of resistance was coordinated with division artillery. concentrations were planned by the unit forward observer and the patrol leader. The forward observers remained in contact with the patrol by wire and radio until it returned.
One platoon of the 82d AAA AW Battalion (SP) was in direct support of each regiment on Line JAMESTOWN. These platoons fired both prearranged fires and harrassing and interdiction fires. During the period 1-18 September, two M-39's personnel carriers transported supplies to BALDY and EERIE. From 19-30 September four carriers were so used.

ARMOR SUMMARY
During the month of September one company of the 72d Tank Battalion was in direct support of each front line regiment. on 24 September the three 105 mm howitzers (assault guns) were placed under the operational control of the 37th Field Artillery Battalion.

ENGINEER SUMMARY
The bulk of the engineer effort during September was devoted to the repair of the damage caused by the rainy season and to the improvement of the lines of communication. The log bunker and the attack bunker program was continued and accelerated.

AIR SUPPORT
During the month aircraft were available for but fifteen days. For the period 1-18 September13 of the 65 air strikes requested were honored. During the BALDY operation, all requests were honored. on the 19th, 20th and 21st, 38 requests were honored. These strikes involved 150 aircraft. Flare ships illuminated the BALDY area on the nights of 18-19 and 20-21 September.

 

COMBAT EFFICIENCY
During September the combat efficiency of the 2d US Infantry Division was considered to be excellent.
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
As a result of the operations during September the 2d Division continued to occupy and defend its assigned sector of Line JAMESTOWN. At the close of the period the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry was on KIMPO PENINSULA and the 9th Infantry (minus 1st Battalion)(Thailand Battalion attached) was preparing to assume responsibility for CAMP CASEY.

C. INTELLIGENCE
The 2d Division was faced by five battalions of infantry on line. An estimated thirty-one battalions were available as reserves. It was estimated that the strength of the units in contact and of the reserves available were 2,500 and 28,000 respectively.
The 1st Battalion, 345th Regiment, 115th Division, 39th CCF Army was in contact between the 24-26 grid lines; the 2d and 3d Battalions of this regiment were in the grid squares 2233 and 2334 respectively. The 3d and 1st Battalions, 337th Regiment, 113th Division, 38th CCF Army was in contact
between the 26-30 NS grid lines; the 2d Battalion was in reserve in the vicinity of 2538. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 339th Regiment, were in contact between the 30-36 NS grid lines; the 1st Battalion was in reserve in the vicinity of 3143.
The 338th Regiment was in division reserve but could not be located. Reserves capable of intervention were the 343d Regiment, 115th Division located in the vicinity of 1832, the 117th Division, 39th CCF Army located in the vicinity of 1229; the 112th Division, 38th CCF Army located in the vicinity of 2755, and the 341st Regiment, 114th Division, located in grid square 3352. The organization of the two CCF Armies which faced the Indianhead Division were:
39th CCF Army (064437)*
Artillery Regiment..117th Division (1229)..116th Division..115th Division
.........................349th Regiment........346th Regiment..343d Regiment
.........................350th Regiment........347th Regiment..344th Regiment
.........................351st Regiment........348th Regiment..345th Regiment
...............................................................................(210343)

38th CCF Army (276607 or 278621)*
Artillery Regiment..112th Division (2755)..113th Division.....114th Division (354555)
........................334th Regiment..........337th Regiment..340th Regiment
.................................................................................(400520)
........................335th Regiment..........338th Regiment..341st Regiment
.................................................................................(330520)
........................336th Regiment..........339th Regiment..342d Regiment
...........................................................(306417)...........(380467)
*Coordinates are of command posts

The enemy's combat efficiency was considered to be good. The fairly high quality of the troops and their state of preparedness enhanced this efficiency. Morale seemed to vary proportionally to the political indoctrination and the beliefs of the individual. Morale of the average soldier was good.
Around the 18th of September it was apparent that changes in the disposition of enemy units were being effected. Increased troop sightings, increased harassing fires, new emplacements of active artillery and a decided change in radio traffic and security led to this belief. On several occasions the enemy attempted to move large elements of troops during periods of reduced daylight visibility.
The 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment, 115th Division, 39th CCF Army shifted to the west and relieved the 2d Battalion, 344th Regiment. At the same time the 345th Regiment moved into positions to the east of the 344th Regiment; the 1st Battalion replaced the 1st Battalion, 344th Regiment and the 2d and 3d Battalions formed the reserves to the NW and N respectively.
The 338th Regiment, 113th Division, 38th CCF Army was relieved by the 342d and 340th Regiments, ll4th Division. The 338th Regiment moved into division reserve but its exact location could not be determined. The 342d
Regiment placed its 2d and 3d Battalions on line between the 36-42 NS grid lines; the 1st Battalion was in reserve. The 340th Regiment had one battalion on line between the 42-45 NS grid lines and had two battalions in reserve. A correction was made in the proposed boundary line between the 337th and 339th Regiments, 113th Division. The boundary was changed from 265410-290392 to 300380-301360.
Elements of the 1st Battalion, 345th Regiment, 115th Division were identified by enemy documents taken from CCF bodies found on BALDY on 20 September.
This indicated that the unit in position on the main line of resistance was used to make this attack. In mid-July a reserve unit "passed through" front line elements to attack BALDY.
An estimated company attacked PORK CHOP. Personal papers taken from the clothing of enemy dead on 19 September identified the 3d Battalion, 337th Regiment, 113th Division. This further indicated the use of a front line unit in the attack.
To maintain security the enemy continued to use an outpost line of resistance. The enemy defensive positions consisted mostly of fighting bunkers with long, connecting communication trenches. They were exceedingly well 'dug in' and well camouflaged. A second line of resistance appeared to have been maintained a proximately 10,000 meters to the rear of the first.
The natural commanding terrain was occupied by the enemy. Lowlands and avenues of approach were protected by automatic weapons. Friendly elements encountered heavily mined areas in front of enemy positions. In instances demolitions were believed to have been electrically controlled. A large percentage of the mines and charges used were of the concussion type.
Artillery support for units in contact were an estimated seven artillery battalions deployed across the division front and which consisted of an estimated sixty-three pieces. Three of the seven battalions were believed to be 75/76 mm and three to be 122 mm howitzer; the seventh was believed to be a self-propelled 75/76 mm battalion.
The majority of the hostile batteries firing into the 2d Division sector were located beyond the capabilities of artillery organic to the division.
These battalions were positioned near the extension of united Nations divisional boundaries. This enabled them to fire into two UN sectors. The enemy apparently had prepared at least one alternate position for each artillery piece; some of which were stocked with ammunition. 250 alternate positions were counted across the division front.
There was one artillery regiment identified as the 26th Regiment, 1st Artillery Division, tentatively located at 312248. one anti-tank regiment identified as the 404th Regiment of the 32d AT Division was located in the vicinity of 217408. The 27th Artillery Regiment, 1st Artillery Division was reported to be located in the vicinity of 184423.

 

D. PERSONNEL
1 September

Authorized
Officers 1146
EM 17229

Assigned
Officers 1009
EM 16319

Total Gains
Officers 159
EM 1542

Replacements
Officers 115
EM 1042

Hospital Returnees
Officers 23
EM 392

Administrative Gains
Officers 21
EM 108

Requisitions Outstanding
Officers
EM 2058

30 September

Assigned..US.....UN..KATUSA..ROK
Officers..1013...170
EM........16537..2816...2194...29

Total Losses
Officers..183.....92
EM........1692..1077

Battle Losses
Officers...36.....36
EM.........513...526

Non-Battle Losses
Officers...10....11
EM........314...235

Administrative Losses
Officers..137...55
EM.........868..499

Chart 1 ENLISTED GRADE STRUCTURE (30 Sep 52)

Status as of 31 Aug +500 -174 -716 -588 -248
%Over or Short Based on Auth strength: +7.5% -3.8% -28.9% -46.3% -50%
Gains to 30 Sep 191 104 67 45 6
September Promotion Quota: 653 111 156 55 19
Effect of Gains +1344 +41 -493 -488 -223
Actual Losses through 30 Sep. 452 316 173 115 15
Unrotated for Sep 130 211 102 31 25
Over (+) or Short (-) 30 Sep +762 -486 -768 -634 -263
%Over or Short Based on Auth strength +11.4% -10.7% -31.5% -50% -53%
%Loss or Gain since 31 Aug +3.9% -6.9% -2.6% -3.7% -3%
If the Rates of Loss and Gain Continues,
We would look like this 1 Jul 53: +46.5% -72.8% -54.9% -83.3% -80%

There were 2458 class II personnel assigned which represented 13.4 percent of the authorized aggregate strength.
Assignment of replacements to the 2d Division by Eighth Army is not sufficient to replace casualties and sustain rotation. The criteria for rotation (accrual of the required CMS plus an available qualified replacement) was difficult for the men to understand: especially that part which required an available replacement. This failure to understand it was due in part to a previously adequate flow of replacements which had permitted rotation of all personnel when eligible. Raising the number of points necessary for rotation in October temporarily relieved the personnel shortage. It did not benefit morale.
During September 278 Class II replacements were received. Rotation could not be effected against these replacements as they were assigned to units understrength class II personnel. The plan was to level the percentage of class II personnel within subordinate units at 13 percent. Most of the personnel eligible for rotation were in the regiments. These already had 13 percent class II personnel assigned.
The majority of· replacements received continued to be basic infantry soldiers, grade E2. Assigned grade strength compared to authorized grade strength reveals the following shortages as of 30 September: E7, 263; E6, 634; ES, 768; and E4, 486. Time in grade and position vacancy requirements were such as to predicate the eventual elimination of assigned grade strength in the upper four grades. (see Chart 1) Monthly promotion quotas received from EUSAK are inadequate to sustain strength. Qualified NCO replacements, therefor, must be assigned. In numerous instances enlisted men are performing the duties of two grades higher. It is not unusual to find Sergeants First Class acting as First Sergeants, Corporals as Platoon Sergeants and Privates First Class as squad and assistant squad leaders. The latter presents a problem since a soldier can not be punished for failure to obey the order of an acting non-commissioned officer.
At the close of the period there was a shortage of experienced captains,
infantry company commanders; infantry officers with communication and motor maintenance background; and warrant officers, unit administrators. Other critical officer shortages and expected losses were: Lt Ccol, AG (2110) Div AG; Lt Col, CE {1331) Bn Comdr; Lt Col, Inf (8104) CAO; Lt Col, MPC (9101) FM; Lt Col, MC (3500) Med Bn Comdr; Lt Col, MC (3100) Med Staff Off; Lt Col, Ord (4512) Ord Off; Maj, CE {2162) Bn S3; Maj, MC (3005) Prevenative Med; Maj, MC (3130) Neuropsychiatrist; three Maj, MC ( 3500) Med Off Comd; Maj , DE (3175) Prosthodentist; Maj, DE (3178) Staff Dental Off; Capt, Inf (4210) Div PX Off; and a Lt, QM (2430) GFO. Battery grade artillery officer losses would have been extremely high if rotation had been permitted upon attainment of EUSAK eligibility criteria. The average rotation criteria for 2d Division Artillery officers was 41 CMS. Category IV personnel were not released until 35 days prior to their ETS because of the existiilg shortage. Expected losses of artillery officers during october: 80 cat IV (ETS) and 36 on CMS.
There were 105 courts-martials during september: 2 General, 30 Special
and 73 Summary. In general the cases were included under Articles of the code 86, 91, 92, 113, 121, 128 and 134.
Of the 214 deceased or enemy buried ten were unidentified.
US 127, ROKA 21, Netherlands Det. 4, UNKNOWN 10, ENEMY BURIED 62
Enemy dead were buried in the Chommel Enemy Cemetary #1, Chommel, Korea
268337.
The Korean draft administrator was relieved from attached to the Civil Affairs section and attached to the CIC Team at the PWE. This permitted more expedient processing of indigenous personnel. All civilians living north of the Farm Line in the Chongson-Myon area were registered. This facilitated the apprehension of civilians not authorized to be in the area. A questionnaire was prepared which would be used to reflect the political, economic, and social developments within the populated communities of the division area. The civilian evacuation policy was changed. Prostitutes were charged and placed in custody of the Uijongbu National Police for booking, fingerprinting, and further action as deemed necessary. Other mature civilians were placed in the custody of the National Police who returned them to their home area. Orphans and children under sixteen years of age were evacuated through the Uijongbu Civilian Hospital. Using DDT, the Civil Affairs section instigated a program to eliminate enciphalitis breeding areas. The morale of the division was excellent. The maximum. use of Rest and Recuperation and post Exchange facilities, full religious coverage, and touring USO Shows, plus other special service activities were major contributions to the excellent morale. tack of adequate replacements limited rotation and inadequate promotion quotas were factors detrimental to morale. 194 officers and 1521 enlisted men visited Rest and Recuperation centers.

 

140 officers and 164 enlisted men were decorated; 163 Purple Hearts were awarded. A total of 3368 officers and 8781 enlisted men had been decorated. 137 awards were pending final action.
E. LOGISTICS
At the opening of the period logistical installations, trains and troops pertaining to supply were located as shown on Map B.

ORDNANCE
During the operation in the vicinity of BALDY ammunition supply functioned smoothly and all combat requirements were fulfilled.
ALL SERVICES
For the supply authorized and on hand see G4 periodic Logistical Reports,
Supporting Documents.

CHEMICAL
Each flame thrower located on the outpost line of resistance and the main line of resistance were serviced on an average of twice for each item.
There were twenty-six flame throwers and fifty-two service trips were made.
The main difficulty was lack of knowledge and lack of command supervision.
The majority of service trips were caused by low pressure in pressure tanks.
Instruction was given to personnel of using units and the necessity for command supervision stressed.

SURGEON
The problem of speedy evacuation of seriously wounded casualties to Mobile Army Surgical Hospital was solved by the use of a rail bus. This vehicle, with a capacity of thirteen litter patients was controlled by the Division Clearing Company.
Hospital trains began operation in the division sector in September.
One arrived every second day or as required.
The combination of rail-bus and hospital trains reduced ambulance service beyond the Division Clearing Station to a negligible amount.
TRANSPORTATION
A total of 208 railcars satisfied all division requirements for September.
The move of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry required twelve railroad coaches and fifty-seven 21/2 ton trucks. Support rendered the 1st ROK Division on 29-30 September required 104 21/2 ton trucks.
SIGNAL
The Signal Company devoted its time to winterization of communication wires. Wires were serviced and strung to reduce the loss of efficiency and possibility of the wires becoming buried by the anticipated snow.
WINTERIZATION
Under the supervision of the G4, personnel of the technical services inaugurated a winterization program in an attempt to forestall the problems ot the winter of 1951-52. A four day "winterization" school was conducted for officers and men representing subordinate units. A memorandum which consolidated all available information concerning preparation of equipment for cold weather operation and the medical aspects of cold weather was published and distributed to every unit in the division.
There were problems. The more important are discussed below.
ORDNANCE
Radiators have been critically short since the summer months. Those presently in use have been repeatedly repaired. At the close of the period the division required 700 radiators for 21/2 ton trucks. They were unavailable.
The winterization program was delayed by a lack of grease seals.
Winterization of vehicles required that G.A grease be used. This in turn necessitated an ample supply of grease seals. Only a limited supply of seals were available.
QUARTERMASTER
Winter clothing which had been renovated caused a serious problem. In anticipation of problems, General Fry ordered that units make every effort to issue correctly fitting winter clothing to their men, tag the clothing and properly store it until weather conditions made issue necessary.
The clothing was received in bundles which were marked with the size of the item it contained. A size was also marked on each item. It was found that these marked sizes were not correct. A division exchange program had to be inaugurated in an attempt to properly fit each soldier. By the close of the
period, however, neither winter underwear nor olive drab wool trousers could
be fitted to all men.
ENGINEER
The Division Engineer could not obtain lumber or sufficient nails.
These would have been used for con$truction of insulated bunkers and living quarters.
During August the Division Engineer requisitioned 2,000 pieces of lumber and the requisition was filled. In September 100,000 board feet were requisitioned and none was received.
During August 2,300 pounds of nails were requisitioned; 300 pounds were received. In September 7,000 pounds of the 14,000 pounds requisitioned were received.
Aside from the shortages concerning the winterization program there were other shortage problems.
The absence of vehicular spare parts caused the loss of manpower and maintenance effort. vitally required parts were necessarily obtained from vehicles being evacuated.
The shortage of replacement engines forM-39's necessitated conversion of C-4 engines.
SUPPLY
Attached is Periodic Logistics Report Number 473. The three other reports that constitute a four week period are included in the Supporting Documents.
Items in both critical and short supply are indicated according to service and class.
F. CHRONOLOGY
6 Sep: Prince Rang Apakrikon, Thailand Air Force Commodore visited the division.
8 Sep: Lt Gen Paul W. Kendall, I US Corps Commander attended French ceremony.
9 Sep: Maj Gen William E. Shambora, FECOM Surgeon; Col L. Holmes Ginn, EUSAK Surgeon; Col Clement F. St John, Chief, Plans and Operations, surgeon General's Office, Dept of the Army; Col Harold W Glattly, Chief of Personnel, surgeon General's Office, Dept of the Army, visited the division.

 

10 Sep: Following Congressmen visited the 2d Division: Rep C. Clark Fisher, (D, Texas); Rep Charles H. Elston, (R, Chio); Rep Carroll D· Kearns, (R, Penna); Rep Clyde Doyle, (D, Calif); Philip Kelleher, Armed Services Committee Counsel; Gen James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, EUSAK; and Lt Gen Paul W. Kendall, Commanding General, I US Corps.
13 Sep: Maj Gen Stephen N. Shoosmith, Deputy Chief of Staff, UN Command; Maj Gen Robert L. Dulaney, Commanding General, 3d US Infantry Division; Brig Gen John V. 'daters, Chief of Staff, I US Corps, visited the Indianhead Division.
18 Sep. Maurice DeJean, France Is ambassador to Japan; Capt. Vincent Maincent, military attache to French embassy, Tokyo, visited the division.
18 Sep: CCF troops capture BALDY·
18-21 : 23d Infantry relieves 9th Infantry on Line JAMESTOWN.
19 Sep: Gen James A. Van Fleet and Lt Gen Paul W. Kendall visited the 2d Division.
20-21 : 38th Infantry recaptures BALDY.
23 Sep: Col A. W. Stuart assumes command of 38th Infantry Regiment.
25 Sep: 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry departs for KIMPO PENINSULA.
30 Sep: 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry arrives CAMP CASEY.
G. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
COMMANDER'S EVALUATION
Engineer Bunkers
The use of prefabricated "Abe Lincoln" bunkers and the assault type bunker proved to be of great value to the infantry soldier.
The display of imagination, initiative and team spirit by members of the 2d Engineer combat Battalion when they conceived, developed and voluntarily produced these bunkers is typical of the spirit of 2d Division - Second To None!
THE BALDY OPERATION
The combination of intelligence estimate, terrain analysis, and knowledge and understanding of the political aspects of the Korean war foretold the enemy attack on BALDY.
Troops of an estimated enemy battalion were in Company K's trenches minutes after their preparatory fires lifted. This fact indicated that the Chinese were able to infiltrate a battalion through an area under our continuous observation and traversed by our patrols. The request from the Commanding Officer, Company K for artillery fires on his position was in accord with defensive doctrine. The repeated failure of communications is believed to be only partially due to enemy activity and worn equipment. It is believed that the major contributing factors were: (1) Officers and enlisted man had insufficient knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the radio sets they used, (2) there was a lack of well qualified radio operators and communication sergeants at rifle company level, (3) infantry battalions and companies failed to properly lay and service communication wire, and (4) commanders placed almost complete reliance upon wire communication.
The decision of the regimental commander to move Company E forward to occupy blocking positions was in accordance with defense doctrine. It is believed, however, that the platoon patrol sent forward from Company E should have been from a unit other than a company of the regimental reserve. On the night of 18 - 19 September the situation had been too vague to warrant a counter-attack. On the morning of the 19th, however, the only unknown elements were the strength and exact location of the enemy on the hill. Company K, as a unit, did not exist. The forward movement of the enemy had ceased. It was known that two platoons advancing simultaneously, each well supported by fire and each approaching the enemy from a different direction, had been forced to withdraw. It was known that the enemy had reserves with which he could reinforce the position and that he controlled a route over which they could move.
The decision to commit the reserve was proper. At the time this decision was made plans for intermediate attacks should have been cancelled.
Such cancellation would have permitted Company L to occupy its original position on the main line of resistance and would have eliminated much of the subsequent shuffling of units.
An evaluation of the final attack was made by General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, EUSAK, who stated, "The recapture and subsequent consolidation of this key terrain feature against a determined Communist force supported by intense artillery and mortar fire, exemplified the spirit and resourcefulness of this command."
PORK CHOP
Company commander, Company B, 38th Infantry; the officer and men of the second platoon, Company B; and the men of the machine gun section, Company D were officially commended in a letter written by the commanding General, 2d Infantry Division for holding its ground on PORK CHOP with "grim determination and tenacity" on 18 September. The letter continued and stated "I can only say that although I expect such duty under these circumstances, nevertheless it is in accordance with the very finest and highest tradition or our service and of the "Second To None" Division."
DISCUSSION
GENERAL: The "Abe Lincoln" prefabricated bunker program was initiated by the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion on 21 July 1952. The purpose of this program was to provide a stout bunker that could be (1) mass produced for quantity production, (2) transported easily· to front line unloading points, (3) handled easily by carrying parties to the construction site, and (4) erected speedily by untrained personnel. The notched log design adopted provides a high degree of structural strength. Eight inch logs are used for the sides and roof; smaller logs are used for the bursting plate. Each side log is notched on both ends. Firing apertures are constructed according to infantry requirements. At present the apertures are approximately 14" x 36". The inside of the bunkers measure ten feet in width and eight feet in depth.
DISTRIBUTION: The logging site for the division is located 20 miles from the construction sit. Approximately 17 trucks are provided daily by the Division Quartermaster to transport the logs from the logging site. Each log is marked to indicate its position in the bunker. Each bunker is loaded on a quartermaster truck which delivers it to a front line battalion. Delivery is coordinated with the regimental supply officers.
PRODUCTION: Four hundred and ninety-eight bunkers have been prefabricated and delivered between the inception of the program, 21 July 1952 and 1 October 1952.
DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED: The greatest difficulty encountered in the bunker production was the availability of logs. Existing stands of suitable trees were small and widespread. A secondary obstacle was that other engineer projects restricted the number of personnel available to operate the program. At first the effectiveness of the program was considerably lessened by misuse of the bunkers. Many of the logs were used for construction in battalion and regimental CP areas. It was found that units on the outposts were not inclined to carry the heavier logs up the hills but would take only the lighter logs designed for the top burster plate. Only by the concentrated
efforts of P and A platoons, AT and M platoons and the Engineers did the operation become effective.
ADVANTAGES: The prefabricated bunkers have proved to be superior to those of other construction. use of these bunkers automatically eliminates poor and often dangerous construction practices. once the logs are in the platoon area and the holes are dug, a rifle platoon can complete three (to include proper overhead cover) in one night. Of the 250 "Abe Lincoln" bunkers on position during the rainy season none collapsed. Approximately 375 of other design did.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the pertinent portions of the above discussion accompanied by diagrams be disseminated to all tactical commands. This will enable all to profit by the experience gained and lessons learned by the 2d Infantry Division - SECOND TO NONE!

J C. FRY
Major General U. S. Army Commanding

 

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The Aerial Recon Photographs 1/3.

 

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The Aerial Recon Photographs 2/3

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The Aerial Recon Photographs 3/3

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A. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: One (1) Officer and thirteen (13) EM
B. TASK: To reconnoiter stream bed and to contact enemy and capture PSW
C. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 192100 Sep 52
D. TIME OF RETURN: 200200 Sep 52
E· ROUTE: From CT354382 followed river bank to CT346384 and cut due North over foot path past OF No 1 at CT345386. Went due Northwest to within twenty yards of the stream at CT343391 where patrol was ambushed by approximately two enemy squads.
F. TERRAIN: The path leading from OP No 1 is a gradual descent and ends in the vic CT344.388. The heavy growth of weeds (3 feet high), shell craters, and wet rice paddies makes walking very difficult in the valley to the North of the base of the hill at CT343388.
G. ENEMY: At CT342.393 the friendly forces were proceeding North when they were ambushed by an est two (2) enemy squads. The enemy opened fire on the six man recon group with burp guns, rifle fire, and hand grenades. The enemy concealed in a triangular group of bushes and after the recon group entered the triangle they opened fire. Just before the enemy fired the advance scout, who was approximately ten feet in front of the main group heard the enemy talking in the bushes ahead of him. While he was in the process of passing the information back to the platoon leader the enemy fired. In the brief encounter the asst plat leader who was second in line dropped to the ground and crawled east about twenty yards. He opened fire on the enemy positions, continued firing until his carbine jammed and then threw two grenades in the bushes where he had heard a loud scream. The fire coming from that direction stopped immediately and the assistant patrol leader heard a short cry of agony from the area where he threw the grenades. It is estimated that the enemy suffered one KIA and one WIA. The asst plat ldr then observed the enemy screening the area but he could not notice if the enemy picked up either the patrol leader or the advance scout who was later missing in action. The asst ptl ldr withdrew to the rallying point at GT345397, Half way back he found two wounded members of the recon group and called for aid for these men. Finally reaching the rallying point two other walking wounded were found and aid from the support group helped evacuate all the wounded. At 0300 a screening force was dispatched to screen the area but because of daylight they were forced to discontinue the search without finding any trace of the missing men.

K. RESULT OF ENCOUNTER WITH ENEMY: TWO friendly MIA, Six friendly WIA
one en est KIA, One en est WIA
L· CONDITION OF PATROL: Condition of patrol was excellent up until time of ambush when the entire group was demoralized with the loss of the patrol leader.

1. Mission: To establish night ambush and capture PSW
2. Unit: Co G, 23d Infantry
3. Composition: one (1) rifle squad reinf with one (1) IMG and crew
4. Time of departures 212400 sep 52
5. Time of return: 220600 Sep 52
6. Route: See O/L. Objective CTJ13.36l
7. Debriefing: patrol from Co G consisting of one (1) rifle squad and one (1) LMG· Patrol crossed the 1D at 2400 hrs. The patrol used the regularly scheduled route. While proceeding along the route to the objective the patrol leader observed that the path he followed from either side by double apron barbed wire fence and at several places there were triangular tags hanging on the fence.
The patrol leader stated that the trail was too narrow for vehicular traffic but that the ground was fairly firm. At 0220 hrs the patrol was at CT317.360 which was about 100 yards short of the assigned objective. At this point and time the friend~ patrol was fired on by a group of enemy consisting of approximately eight (8) men from vicinity of CT.315.359. The friendly patrol withdrew after being fired on for approximately two (2) minutes. The friendly patrol did not return the fire but withdrew to vicinity CT.319360 and called in Artillery, mortar and small arms fire (from 1st plat Co G). Patrol leader again advanced on his original route with six (6) riflemen. When he started forward the patrol leader instructed his IMG crew and two (2) riflemen to remain at CT319.360 and cover his advance. The patrol leader accompanied by the six (6) men advanced to a point in the vicinity of CT312.360 arriving there at 0520 hrs. When the patrol leader reached this point the enemy again opened fire on the IMG that had remained in position in vicinity of CT.319360. The IMG returned the fire. The patrol leader and the six (6) men also opened fire on the enemy which at this time began withdrawing to the North. The patrol leader's group pursued the retreating enemy but lost sight of them in the darkness. The patrol advanced and attempted to regain contact but was unable to do so. By this time it was getting light so the patrol began their return to the MLR. The patrol closed in to the MLR at 0600 hrs.


A· SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL: One NCO and 22 EM
B. TASK: To contact enemy, capture PSW and establish a five man OP for next day
C. TIME OF DEPARTURE: 271950 Sep 52
D. TIME OF RETURN: 282350 Sep 52
E. ROUTE: From CT351389 N along finger to small knoll at CT348394. At this point the advanced scout and patrol leader reconnoitered the flanks of the knoll. After they reported all clear the main body of the patrol advanced over the left slope being careful not to silhouette themselves along the skyline. They continued on to CT348395 where the support group was set up in a tight perimeter overlooking the objective at CT34B399. The ten man recon group continued on to within 50 yards of the commo trench at CT347397. This group found a small skirmish line and the patrol leader and three other men advanced to within five yds of the commo trench when the patrol leader initiated the action. The patrol returned by same route using the leap frog method.
F. TERRAIN: The trail through the mined areas to the direct front of Love OP No 2 was still muddy and slippery from the preceding days rain. The knoll at CT348394 was also muddy in spots and the descent dawn the N slopes was very difficult over the loose rocks along the path.
G. ENEMY: At 2115 the advanced scout group of our men saw approximately 10 helmets protruding up over the edge of the commo trench at CT348397. The group crawled within five yds of the enemy where the patrol leader led the men in the initial assault on the enemy. The friendly troops opened fire with carbines, one BAR, and one .45 cal pistol. The enemy, stunned by the aggressiveness, waited almost a minute before they retaliated with S/A, HG, and MG fire. The four men hit the ground and took cover in a couple of small shell craters. From this position they threw a total of 32 HG which blasted and routed the enemy from their positions. As the enemy withdrew they wildly threw grenades at the friendly forces. The majority of these landed over the heads of the scout group and exploded harmlessly in the vacant area between the recon and the scout party. Only two grenades landed close to the advance party but one of those was a dud and the other which bounced off the patrol leaders leg and rolled directly beside the asst scout did not have the pin pulled. At this time the group tried to approach the commo trench to pick up a PW but a MG opened fire from the vic of a bunker on the extreme right flank of the knoll and the friendly maneuvered back to gain additional fire support from the rest of the patrol. After joining the recon and the support group, which had pulled up to give assistance they called for Artillery fire and fixed bayonets for an attack on the enemy. While they continued firing the enemy was heard to be shouting commands in the Korean language. one command was given for "the first platoon to move out to the left to outflank the friendly forces" Another shouted that "It's Americans, start firing", and followed by some sort of command for the second platoon. Upon the short blast of a bugle the friendly artillery and mortar fire covered the knoll and the enemy once again, retreated northward. It is believed that the enemy was caught in the process of bringing up reinforcements and was regrouping for an attack. After this no signs of enemy activity were observed except for men running back over the ridge line towards Pig Dagmar CT346410. These en were also believed to be caught in a steady stream of Quad .50 and tank fire on the path CT347406 leading up towards the saddle between the twin peaks of Big Dagmar. En mortar and direct fire 76 mm mountain guns started falling around the patrol. Friendly ammo and HG's being very short, orders to disengage were given and the patrol leap frogged back to Love Co HLR. All the way back enemy 105 mm (est) artillery pursued the friendly element.
K. RESULT OF ENCOUNTER WITH ENEMY: seven (7) enemy counted KIA; Fifteen estimated WIA; undetermined number of enemy casualties from friendly artillery, mortar, quad .so, and tank fire. one friendly KIA (MG fire); one friendly WIA (shell fragment)
L. CONDITION OF PATROL: Excellent

 

 

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Digging deeper brings the Regimental Report for September 1952.

 

INTRODUCTION
During the period 17 Aug thru 20 Aug 52, the 38th Infantry Regiment relieved the 23rd Infantry Regiment in the assigned sector of LINE JAMESTOWN. No significant operations were under taken. The last week brought intense rains and extensive damage to defensive positions. The period closed with all elements of the 38th Infantry giving maximum effort to reconstruction of installations and road nets.

Unit location and commanding officers of the Regiment at the beginning of the period were as follows:

38th Vic CT289306 Lt-Col William F. Kernan
1st Bn Vic CT309281 Maj Jack A. Dunlap
2nd Bn Vic CT301322 Maj Henry Greer
3rd Bn Vic CT275299 Lt-Col George C. Fogle
ND Bn Vic CT286321 Lt Col Cornelis Schilperoord

NARRATIVE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Tactical operations for the period 1 Sept to 17 Sept consisted of an active defense and improvement of LINE JAMESTOWN. The Regiment continued reconstruction of damage done during the heavy rains of late August. On 5 Sept the 1st Bn which had been in the reserve positions commenced relief of the Netherlands Detachment in the center of the regimental sector. At 0516451 Sept the 1st Bn assumed responsibility for the sector. The Netherlands Bn closed
reserve positions Vic 309202 at 0616451 Sept 52 and commenced a seven day training program.
The regiment dispatched combat, reconaissance, ambush, patrols, and listening posts each night to provide information, early warning, and to capture enemy PsW. On the night of 12-13 Sept 52 "C" Co patrol with Regt I & R attached engaged UNE in intermittent fire fights from 2030 hours to 0035 hours. Vic CT2718356 and CT283355. The enemy suffered Est 4 WIA and 12 counted KIA. On the same evening two other patrols made contact with the enemy in short fire fights. Estimate an additional 20 enemy casualties from these two actions.
On 17 Sept the Netherlands Detachment assumed responsibility fir the right sector of the regiment. The 2d Bn moved into the regimental reserve positions and prepared to conduct a seven day training program.
On 1819001 Sept the enemy launched a coordinated attack on outposts Baldy and Pork Chop. Pork Chop was attacked by an estimated En Co; Baldy an Est En Bn (-).
B Co of the 38th held Pork Chop with a reinforced platoon. The enemy attacked at dusk moving in with his own Arty. The En overran the positions but were driven off. The fire fight continued until 2330 Hrs. The 1st Bn reinforced the platoon of B Co with the 1st Bn Raider Platoon immediately following the fire fight. This action accounted for 60 En KIA counted, 120 En WIA Est.

Simultaneously with the attack on Pork Chop the En attacked OP "Baldy". Making advantage of friendly smoke used to screen the road to the left company's position the En was able to move in close to the OP. The En moved in with his own Arty, an .Est 1000 rounds, and overran K company's Psns on the crest of the hill. The action continued throughout the night, with the 3rd Bn holding fast to the left slope of the hill. Elements of L Co moved up the hill to ascertain the situation on Baldy, crossing the line of departure at 2200 Hrs. E Co moved into blocking Psn Vic CT266321, assuming responsibility for the Psn 1823451 Sept 52. At 1906551 Sept 52 the Elms of L Co dispatched to determine the situation on the crest was forced to W/D due to intense En fire. During the following day C/Atks by the 38th Inf failed to regain the crest. At 2005301 Sept 52 a patrol from I Co reached the 5th bunker of the left slope and stayed in those positions until the hill was retaken the following morning.
During the next two days several reliefs were made in the blocking Psn and left company positions of the 3rd Bn. E Co was relieved in the blocking Psn by C Co of the 2d Eng and returned to previously Reptd Res Psns. G Co Reld L Co in assigned sector at 1908001 Sept 52 and was in turn relieved by the 2d Reconnaisance Co at 1921001 Oct 52.
The morning immediately following the En attack on "Old Baldly" intense Arty and air power was directed at all known enemy installations in the immediate vicinity of the affected point. 18 air strikes were directed at lucrative targets with excellent results. The pressure on the enemy from air bombardment was kept up throughout the night with radar directed MPQ-2 bombings close in.
All day the 20th continued air strikes were placed repeatedly on close in enemy strong points, 10 air strikes were conducted on that day, along with MPQ-2 bombings during the night.
At 2005301 Sept 52 a patrol from Item Co reached the 5th bunker on the right slope of Baldy. The patrol remained in the positions until the subsequent C/Atks that evening.
On the morning of 19 Sep 52 the commanding officer of the 2d Bn was notified that his Bn was to conduct a Bn size C/Atk on "Old Baldy". thorough reconnaisance and planning was undertaken by the Bn commander and staff.

Due to the nature of the terrain the only possible method of attack which would allow the Bn to make maximum use of its striking force was a double envelopment coming up the right and left fingers of the hill. One company was to attack up the left finger, and one company up the right finger with the third company in reserve. With the method and direction of the attack dictated by the formation of the ground the remaining decisions to be made were: (a) Should the attack be launched during the day or night and in either event at what time. ( Should the attack have a heavy Arty preparation or should it be made with none.
The advantages of the day attack over the night attack was that as thorough a reconnaisance would not be necessary. Control during the attack would greatly be increased. The greater advantages rested with the night attack, the attacking elements could move under the cover of darkness and gain surprise. The attacking elements when joined could consolidate the ground, and any large coordinated enemy counterattack would have to come during the daylight hours or after dark the next evening. In either case we would be gaining time or force the enemy to attack during daylight hours. It was because of the latter that the night attack was decided upon. I Corps rendered the decision as to the time of the attack to coordinate with an attack on Kelly Hill in the adjacent division sector. Recent experiences by this regiment have indicated that when an Arty preparation is used the Chinese are prepared for the attack which follows and there is no element of surprise. The area has been thoroughly saturated with air strikes, night bombings, and heavy Arty fires continually after the initial attack on Baldy. Three tanks were sent up the hill early on the day preceding the attack and fired the entire day at enemy positions. The decision was made to attack without a preparation in as much as the enemy had been continually pounded since they had. gained thee hill, and had not had the opportunity to build up the defensive positions to any great extent.
The necessary reconnaisance by Bn and Co officers was made on the 19th and 20th of Sep 52. At 2020451 Sep 52 G and F Cos crossed their respective LODs, G Co on the left flank and F Co on the right, moving forward slowly. At 2230 Hrs F Co was pinned down by heavy En fire, E Co moved forward. At 2247 Hrs to reinforce F Co. G, F and E Cos moved slowly up the hill reaching the crest of Baldy at 2106201 Sep 52 and secured the hill.

The 2d Bn immediately began the task of reorganizing and consolidating the position. Supplies and reinforcements were brought up throughout the day. The Bn organized the hill as a separate strong point, overhead cover on fighting positions were constructed as quickly as possible with what material was available.
After Baldy was secured a concerted effort on the part of the 38th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Engineers, and other support elements of the division was directed at making "Old Baldy" a fortress. Maximum effort was given to "Baldy" with considerable effort directed at outposts Erie, Arsenal and Pork Chop. The 2d Engineers began construction of a road for wheeled vehicles to Baldy to replace the existing road which could be used by personnel carriers only. The Engineers also began work on a wheeled vehicle road to Erie, a road previously passible to personnel carriers only.
At 2115301 Sept the 2d BN of the 9th Inf began the relief of the 1st Bn in the center sector of the Regiment. The plan being to have the 1st Bn which had not sustained heavy casualties, relieve the 3rd Bn in the left sector. The 2nd BN of the 9th assumed responsibility for the center sector on 2117301 Sept and passed to Opn control of the 38th Inf.
Col A W Stuart assumed command of the 38th Inf Regiment on 2308301 Sept 52.
On 27 Sep the 2d Bn of the 38th Infantry relieved the 2d Bn of the 9th Inf in the center sector of the regiment. The 2nd Bn of the 38th Inf assumed responsibility for the sector at 2709001 Sep and the relief was completed by 2711091 Sep.

During the month of Sep the 38th continued an active defense of its assigned sector of LINE JAMESTOWN, sustaining two heavy En attack on major outposts. On 18 Sep the En launched a coordinated attack on two of the regimental combat outposts. The major En effort was directed toward the outpost on Hill 266, more commonly known as "Baldy". A secondary effort assumed to be a diversion was made on combat out post "Pork Chop" at the same time. The 38th Inf retained control of Pork Chop and regained control of "Baldy" with a coordinated Bn attack conducted by the 2d Bn. On 20 Sep. The remainder of the month was devoted to conducting extensive refortification of "Old Baldy" with the other combat out posts. Work plans, progress reports and a master work plan for the Regt front was developed to guide the construction. The period closed with the 38th Infantry in complete control of all previously reported defensive positions.

S-3 Monthly Summary (September)

From 1 thru 4 Sep 52 38th Inf Regt W/ND Atchd Cont Def and improvement on LINE JAMESTOWN. Res Bn conducted unit and specialist training, The Regt'l RTC Cont six (6) day Replacement Training Program throughout period.
On 1 Sep 52 L Co Rel I Co on Psns, assuming Resp for sector at 0550 Hrs.
On 3 Sep 52 F Co Rel G Co on Psns, assuming Resp for sector at 0815 Hrs.
On 5 Sep 52 1st Bn commenced Rel of ND on Psns, 1st Bn assuming Resp for sector at 1645 Hrs. B Co ND passed to Opnl C 1st Bn at 1645 Hrs. Rel of ND Bn by 1st Bn complete at 0606001 Sep 52 and B Co reverted to Ctl of ND Bn. ND Bn Ret to Regt'l Res Vic CT309282 assuming Resp for Regt'l Res 061645 Sep 52.
From 7 Sep 52 to 16 Sep 52, Regt Cont Def of LINE JAMESTOWN with Res Bn conducting unit and specialist training.
On 9 Sep 52 K Co Rel I Co on Psns, with 2d Recon utilized as blocking force in K Co Psns during Rel. At 1605 Hrs K Co assumed Resp for new sector. At 1840 Hrs I Co assumed Resp for Prev K Co sector releasing 2d Recon Co. 2d Recon Ret to Prev Reptd Res Psns at 1840 Hrs.
On the night of 11-12 Sep 52 E Co dispatched a combat Ptl. Ptl Eng UNE in commo trenches and bunkers Vic CT296356. Brief FF resulted in 5 to 8 En casulties. Frdly Prl Clsd Psns at 0550 Hrs with negative casualties. Two other small Ptl contacts on night of 11-12 Sep 52. Brief FF with En withdrawing.
On night of 12-13 Sep 52 C Co Ptl with I&R Atchd Eng UNE in intermittent firefights from 2030 to 0035 Hrs in Vic CT278356 and CT283355. En suffered Est 4 WIA and 12 counted En KIA. Two other Ptls contacted En with 10 and 5 minute firefights. En suffered an additional 20 casualties.
On 17 Sep 52 ND Bn commenced Rel of 2d Bn on Psns. ND Bn assumed Resp for sector at 1805301 Sep and Rel Completed at 0640 Hrs. 2nd Bn Clsd new Res Psns 18 Sep and prepared for unit and specialist training.
On 1819001 Sep 52 En Bn launched coord Atk on OPs Baldy and Porkchop. Action on Baldy cont until 2106201 Sep 52 when Frdly forces secured the Hill.
On 1819001 Sep OP Porkchop Atk by Est En Co. B Co Plat held Psns and FF ended at 2330 Hrs. 1st Bn Raider Plat reinforced B Co immediately following FF. At 1400 Hrs A Co Rel B Co and Raider Plat on Psns, assuming Resp for Porkchop at 1400 Hrs. En casualties suffered were counted 60 KIA and 130 Est WIA.
On 1819001 Sep 52 Op Baldy Atkd by Est En Bn (-). Action Cont thoughout the night with K Co Psns on rest of hill overrun, holding fast to left slope of hill. Elms L Co crossed LD at 2200 Hrs to ascertain situation on Baldy. E Co moved into bocking Psn Vic CT266321, assuming Resp for Psns at 1823451 Sep 52. At 2040 Hrs E Co Atchd Cpn Ctl of 3d Bn. At 1906551 Sep 52 Elms L Co forced to W/D due to intense En fire. At 1908001 Sep 52 G Co assumed Resp for L Co sector and passed to Opn Ctl of 3d Bn at 0715 Hrs. At 1912001 Sep 52 Elms of E Co, K Co, L Co with 5 Tks 38th Tk Co Atchd, C/Atk on Baldy, reached crest of hill but forced to W/draw due to intense En fire. C Co 2d Engr reverting to Ctl of 2d Engr Bn at 2010001 Sep 52. Elms I Co Deptd LD at 200530 Hrs reinforcing 5 bunker Psns held on left slope of Baldy. At 2045 Hrs G, F Co crossed LD for Coord Atk on Baldy, G on left flank and F Co on right. At 2105 Hrs G and F Co engaged in FF, moving forward slowly. At 2230 Hrs F Co pinned down by heavy En fire, E Co moved forward at 2247 Hrs to reinforce F Co. G, F, E Co moved slowly up hill reaching crest of hill 2106201 Sep 52 securing hill.

S-3 Monthly Summary (cont'd)

On 2115301 Sep 52 Bn 9th Inf commenced Rel of 1st Bn on Psns, assuming Resp of sector at 1730 Hrs. 2d Bn 9th Inf passed to Opn Ctl of the 38th Inf 2117301 Sep 52. Rel by 2d Bn 9th Inf completed at 2050 Hrs. 1st Bn Clsd new Res Assy area at 2115 Hrs.
On 2208301 Sep 52 A Co 38th Inf Rel Elms E, F, G, Co on Baldy, 1st Bn assuming Resp for Baldy at 0830 Hrs. 2d Bn Clsd Regt'l Res Psns at 1050 Hrs.
On 2308301 Sep 52 Col A W Stuart assumed command of the 38th Inf Regt.
On 23 Sep 52 C Co Rel 2d Recon Co on Psns, assuming Resp for Psns at 1155 Hrs. 2d Recon Co Ret to Prev Co area, Atchd Opn Ctl of 38th Inf at 1155 Hrs. On 2311551 Sep 52 1st Bn assumed Resp for former 3d Bn sector. At 0600 Hrs D Co Rel M Co on Psns.
On 23 Sep Frdly Ptl Eng En Ptl Vic CT267344 at 2350 Hrs. Brief FF with Frdly disengaging and Ret to Frdly Psns at 0130 Hrs.
On 24 Sep 52 ND Ptl Eng 5 man En LP at 2100 Hrs. Brief FF, Frdly Ptl Ret to Frdly Psns at 2230 Hrs. Enemy suffered Est 2 KIA.
On 25 and 26 Sep Res Bn conducted unit and specialist training.
On 26 Sep 52 B Co Rel I Co on Psns, assuming Resp for sector at 1230 Hrs. I Co Clsd Res area Vic CT273305 at 1630 Hrs.
On 27 Sep 52 I Co Deptd Res Assy area for Regt'l Res area, closing new Res area Vic CT298313 at 1913 Hrs. I Co reverted to Ctl of parent unit at 1915 Hrs.
On 27 Sep 52 2d Bn 38th Inf Rel 2d Bn 9th Inf on Psns. 2d Bn 38th Inf assumed Resp for sector at 0900 Hrs, Rel completed at 1107 Hrs. At 0900 Hrs 2d Bn 9th Inf reverted to Ctl of parent unit. K Co Rel C Co on Psns at 1355 Hrs, K Co assuming Resp for new sector and passing to Opn Ctl of 1st Bn at 1355 Hrs. C Co Clsd new Res Psn Vic CT279306 at 1450 Hrs.
On 2710301 Sep 52 3d Bn opened CP Vic CT309282.
On 28 Sep 52 C Co Rel A Co on OP "Old Baldy", Rel completed and C Co assumed Resp for OP "Old Baldy" at 0950 Hrs. 2d Recon Co reverted to Division Ctl at 2724001 Sep 52. Co C 2d Engr Bn Atchd to 38th Inf effective 2812001 Sep 52.
On 2806001 Sep 52 1 Plat L Co atchd to C Co, L Co (-) remaining Prev Reptd Psns.
On 29 Sep 52 A Co Rel K Co on Psns, assuming Resp for sector at 1415 Hrs. K Co Clsd new Res area Vic CT266314 at 1430 Hrs, reverting to Ctl of 3d Bn at 1415 Hrs.
On 30 Sep 52 3d Bn (-) commerced unit and specialist training.

Raymond M Baranouskas Capt Inf S-3

 

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION
During this period the Regiment continued its occupation of the LINE JAMESTOWN.
For the period 1-18 September 1952 the emphasis was on improvement and rehabilitation of existing fighting positions. Bunkers were rebuilt, communication trenches deepened, and protective wire laid. All of this work was done under a steady increasing tempo of enemy mortar fire. This action reached a climax on 18 September 1952 when Pork Chop and Baldy received tremendous all day pounding by mortar and artillery to which was added direct fire artillery. This fire severely damaged these positions' bunkers that had previously been considered sound.
Just before dark the fire increased on these positions and the enemy began harrassing fire on the MSR. The Chinese attacked under the cover of this fire and overran both positions. Subsequent events indicate that the Pork Chop operation was a diversion but the enemy intended to stay on Baldy.
The enemy was unable to achieve his goal on Baldy because the Regiment did not give him time to consolidate and organize his position. Constant pressure was maintained on him by combat patrols, tank fire, artillery and mortar fire and air strikes.
On the night of 20-21 September 1952 a seemingly complicated but well coordinated counter attack succeeded in retaking the hill.
Once the hill was retaken the immediate problem was holding against enemy counter attack. Bunkers and communication trenches were almost totally destroyed by the proceeding action. Temporary fighting positions were prepared from material salvaged on Baldy. Then a comprehensive plan was drawn up to construct a self sufficient defensive position. Where previously units had been required to improve positions with their own personnel, all the resources of the Regiment plus engineer and KSC labor were made available to the unit holding Baldy. Work details were set up from the reserve battalion to string barbed wire. The results of this concerted effort has been the steady progress to a truly6 strong defensive position well dug in with plenty of protective wire and a well coordinated defensive fire plan.
Bunkers must be dug in so that only the top protection shows above the surface. Vertical bracing is not enough to stand up under repeated direct hits. Interlocking logs or timber built log cabin style is required. On hill such as these they should be set in the hill with one corner projecting out from the hillside so that grazing fire can be secured. Too many bunkers provide a fine view of the enemy but very small fields of effective fire.
During the period before 18 September 1952 materials such as logs and concertina wire were in short supply and the Regiment was attempting to stay within the ASR on ammunition. The diminution of our fire was countered by an increase in that of the enemy. This increase progressed with an insidiousness that allowed him to punish us severely without it appearing abnormal.
To coordinate the effort of the reconstruction of the Baldy defenses we stayed within the framework of normal command responsibility rather than setting up a special task organization. This has proven most successful.

Roy Brooks Lt Col Inf Exec Officer.

HEADQUARTERS
38th Infantry Regiment
APO 248

8 October 1952

SUBJECT: S-3 Evaluation for Period 1-30 September 1952
TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry Regiment
APO 248

Regimental activities for the month of September were generally limited to the active defense of LINE JAMESTOWN in the regimental sector.
During the period 1 thru 17 September 1952 Regimental effort was directed toward the improvement and strengthening of defensive positions. A comprehensive program of barrier erection was launched with special emphasis being placed on Outposts ARSENAL and OLD BALDY. Due to the proximity of enemy positions as well as the frequence of enemy mortar and artillery fire it was soon determined that it was necessary to erect a form of prefabricated barrier which could quickly be installed with a minimum of personnel. Concertina being unavailable, personnel from reserve elements were utilized to construct wooden knife rests around which barbed wire was attached. These knife rests were carried to the hill crests during daylight hours an fastened in place during darkness. The process achieved excellent results for several nights until the enemy was able to observe our intentions. Subsequent work was greatly impaired by periodic mortar and artillery fire which sometimes totaled between 200 and 400 rounds nightly.
During the period 10 through 20 September 52 great concern was expressed by higher headquarters on ammunition expenditures. At this time tank and mortar ammunition allocations had been exceeded in the division and instructions were received not to fire certain types. Due to shortage of ammunition, efforts were made without success to obtain air strikes.
On 18 September 1952 the tempo of enemy fire increased to such an extent that a special request was submitted to G-3 for tank ammunition. During the day, positions on Baldy were repeatedly hit by recoilless rifle and rocket fire as well as some tank and SP gun fire. During midafternoon an additional allocation of 200 rounds of tank ammunition was received and the tanks on Baldy given permission to fire.

S-3 Evaluation for Period 1-30 September 52 (cont'd)

At 1818501 September 1952 the regimental sector was subjected to intense fire which continued sporadically throughout the night. At 1819001 September 1952 an estimated enemy battalion was reported attacking Old Baldy and an estimated enemy company was attacking Pockchop. Wire communications to the outposts were severed in the initial barrages and subsequent information of a fragmentary nature only was forthcoming by radio from the outposts. The outpost on Porkchop remained in radio contact until 2330 hours when the enemy withdrew and the outpost was re-inforced.
On Old Baldy fragmentary reports indicated that some friendly elements remained on the position. Artillery V. T. fire was placed on Old Baldy upon arrival of the attacking enemy and continually throughout the engagement.
Several counterattacks were launched by Co E from the right and Co L from the left on 19 September 1952. These attacks moved to the extreme flank positions on Baldy where they were forced to stop by heavy casualties inflicted by artillery, mortar and hand grenade fire. Remaining elements of E Co withdrew to blocking positions along the MLR where they were relieved to regroup and prepare for a coordinated counterattack. Elements of L Co remained in position on the left until relieved by a platoon of I Co who remained in contact.
During the period 19-20 September 52 a systematic program of neutralization of enemy positions by tank, artillery and mortar fire coordinated with all available air support was conducted. During this period of attack by fire it became readily apparent that the enemy's ability to defend was seriously affected.
At 2020451 September 1952 a coordinated attack was launched by the 2d Bn to retake Old Baldy. The double envelopment was launched without preparatory fires and was well on the way to the objective before detection. Upon making contact all available supporting fires were called in and the attack progressed slowly against heavy enemy resistance. The reserve company was committed and joined the right company in the assault. The firefight continued throughout the night with attacking forces finally joining on the objective at 2106201 September 1952 and the hill secured.

S-3 Evaluation for Period 1-30 September 52 (cont'd)

On 21 September 1952 2d battalion 9th Infantry was attached to the regiment and relieved the 1st battalion 38th Infantry on position. the 1st battalion then relieved the 2nd battalion on Old Baldy on 22 September 1952 at which time the 2d battalion moved to reserve assembly areas for regrouping.
On 23 September 1952 Colonel A W Stuart assumed command of the regiment and the 1st battalion relieved the 3rd battalion of responsibility for the left battalion sector. The 3rd battalion reverted to regimental reserve.
Following the occupation of Baldy all supporting effort of the regiment was directed at organizing the defenses of the position. Due to enemy fire the number of personnel utilized at one time was restricted. Details were organized to work around the clock with emphasis on forward positions during darkness. Concertina previously unavailable was now provided and a master plan prepared to organize the position for all around defense. Two days after the retaking of Baldy the regiment was placed back on the ASR except during enemy attacks.
On 27 September 1952 the 2d battalion 38th Infantry relieved 2d battalion 9th Infantry on position and the latter unit reverted to control of the 9th Infantry.
During the remainder of the month the regiment continued improvement of positions and dispatched 8 to 12 patrols nightly. The reserve battalion started a seven (7) day training program.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That a systematic program be inaugurated to provide frequent air strikes in front of critical terrain features such as Baldy, Porkchop and Arsenal.
2. That the ASR on ammunition consider the tactical significance of specific positions held so that the defense zone is not jeopardized.
3. That wherever possible communication lines be laid in communication trenches or buried to reduce the possibility of severance of wires by enemy fire.
4. That ready reserve be maintained at close reinforcing distance to critical areas so that counterattacks may be launched swiftly and decisively.
5. That where immediate counterattack is not feasible or fails, that the position be reduced by fire and reoccupied after a well rehearsed and coordinated counterattack can be launched.

Raymond M Baranouskas
Capt Inf
S-3

C. INTELLIGENCE

HEADQUARTERS
38th Infantry Regiment
APO 248
S-2 Evaluation
September 1952

October 4, 1952

1. a. During the period 1-30 September 1952 the regiment occupied positions on line Jamestown.
b. the enemy to the front of the regiment displayed a much more aggressive attitude than was noted in the previous period reported on. Friendly patrols contacted enemy elements at points previously traveled by our patrols without interference. In a few instances he showed disregard for our retalliatory fires, which were limited by available supply rate, by employment of tanks and recoiless rifles in direct fire on friendly positions. The enemy displayed his ability to attack, without warning, under a heavy concentration of supporting artillery,by execution of simultaneous attacks on outposts "Baldy" (CT256323) and Porkchop (CT268337), both of which were successful from the point of view that the enemy was able to reach friendly positions. There two actions are discussed below.

2. a. Baldy Action. On 17 September two enemy tanks and an unknown number of recoiless rifles brought direct fire to bear on positions on "Baldy" (CT256323). This was the first time such action by the enemy was reported in that particular sector. On the following day, the enemy delivered a very large volume of accurate fire throughout daylight hours, covering "Baldy" with at least 1000 rounds. Previous intercepts of enemy radio traffic had mentioned enemy offensive action was to take place on 18 September. This warning, plus the much heavier than normal incoming artillery and direct fire mentioned above, were strong indications of an enemy attack forthcoming and all troops were alerted. At 1850 hours a very intense enemy artillery, mortar, tank fire, and recoiless rifle fire preparation fell on outpost "Baldy" (CT256323), outpost Porkchop (CT268337), and on friendly MLR positions, with a large amount of harassing fire coming in on rear areas. By 1900 hours elemennts of an enemy infantry battalion succeeded in gaining positions on "Baldy", having moved in with an attack towards the center positions and an enveloping force around the east flank.
Although heavy friendly artillery and Cal 50 machine gun fire was immediately called in on friendly positions and although small groups of friendly infantry remained in control of some portions of the hill, the enemy succeeded in his attack and had actual over-all control of the hill. Furthermore, the enemy established a platoon sized ambush on a likely avenue of movement of friendly reinforcements and succeeded in preventing a friendly company from reinforcing during the night of 18-19 September.

Counter attacks by friendly elements during daylight hours of 19 September maintained pressure on the enemy but were driven back by heavy and accurate enemy artillery and mortar. Pressure on the enemy was also placed by friendly tanks, artillery and air,l denying the enemy the opportunity to properly organize the position.
On the night of 20 September a friendly counter attack, moving very aggressively, drove the enemy from "Baldy" in complete confusion. Retreating enemy elements were caught in the open with very heavy VT fire from friendly artillery.
b. It is believed that in spite of the warnings of impending enemy attack, the enemy achieved complete surprise in the initial phase of this action by the following means:
(1) Timing of the attack. Previously the enemy had customarily attacked during complete darkness, usually around midnight. His attack during daylight was a complete departure from past experiences and undoubtdly caught friendly troops at a time when preparations were not completely made for expected action.
(2) The closeness of enemy troops to their own artillery preparation. The enemy infantry was on friendly psotions 10 minutes after the preparation began and before the preparation had completely lifted. Since no unusual sighting had been noted during the day, it is apparent that the enemy successfully infiltrated a battalion sized force to an area 10 minutes marching distance from "Baldy" and assembled and concealed it there.
(3) Intensity of artillery preparation. Friendly troops, although they had received heavy incoming artillery during the day, were not prepared, by experience, for the terrific preparation just prior to the attack.

c. (1) It is believed that the enemy's mission was to attack and hold "Baldy". Indications which point out that intention were numerous. The enemy dead found on the hill were generally equipped with various types of bags containing rations and large amounts of ammunition. At least 60 cases of grenades were brought up by the enemy and put on positions. Many cave type emplacements were found that had been dug by the enemy in his attempts to organize the position. Two flags were found, which has been prepared by enemy units dedicating those units to the siezure of the hill.
(2) The enemy's failure to accomplish the mission of holding "Baldy" was probably due to the constant pressure placed on his troops by friendly air strikes, artillery, tanks, and infantry counter-attacks. It is believed that he suffered approximately 500 casualties during the entire operation and was never able to effectively organize a defense.

3. a. Porkchop Action. At precisely the same time as the artillery preparation and infantry attack took place on "Baldy" similar enemy action was taking place on outpost "Porkchop" (CT268337). The enemy attacked from the north and from the west flank, closely following their artillery preparation as in the "Baldy" action. Enemy infantry reached friendly positions, moved through them and back, assaulted once more to pick up their wounded, and withdrew.
The enemy achieved surprise in much the same manner as noted in the "Baldy" action.
b. It is believed that the enemy's attack on this hill was a diversion to the main effort being made on "Baldy". The indications bearing out such enemy intentions were (1) The enemy could probably have occupied the outpost had he so desired, since most of the friendly troops on the hill were casualties.
(2) A very definite withdrawal, along with attempts to secure his wounded,was made, seemingly according to plan. (3) "Porkchop" could very easily be made untenable to enemy by virtue of friendly dominating observation of the outpost.
4. Aggressive friendly patrolling resulted in 13 patrol contacts, verifying enemy presence at the points of contact and his intentions of resisting efforts to drive him from positions he now occupies. Meeting engagements with enemy patrols in unoccupied terrain showed a marked increase indicating more aggressive patrol activity on the part of the enemy.

5. The enemy only initiated contact, in addition to the two outpost actions noted above, occurred when a small raiding party succeeded in infiltrating to friendly positions on "Baldy". This group entered the communication trenches and succeeded in capturing 1 Katusa soldier before being detected. It is probable that this manuever was executed by a specialized reconnaisance unit whose sole mission is to capture prisoners.
6. Two CCF prisoners, both wounded, were captured by friendly troops during the period, but died of wounds before interrogation was possible.
7. The enemy to the front of the regiment consists of: 39th CCF Army, 1st Bn, 345th Regiment, 115th Division deployed between the CT23__26 grid lines. 38th CCF Army, 1st and 3rd Bn, 337th Regt, 113th Division deployed between the CT26-32 grid lines. The enemy occupies OPLR positions from east to west in our sector on "T-Bone" (CT295358), "Pokkae (CT276349), "Hasakkol" (CT264348) "Hill 228" (CT252325), and "Hill 222" (CT243319).
8. Artillery and mortar fire received has varied from very heavy to very light, with the general pattern throughout the period of a build up to the time of the "Baldy" action, with a very marked decrease since that time.
9. The enemy remains capable of:
(a) Continuing in active defense with units now in contact.
( Launching limited objective attacks with units now in contact.
© Reinforcing "a" or "b" with reserves consisting of 22 battalions.
(d) To launch all out attack with units now in contact and 22 additional battalions carried in reserve.

Walter H Root
Capt Inf
S-2

D. PERSONNEL.

HEADQUARTERS
38th Infantry Regiment
APO 248

5 October 1952

SUBJECT: S-1 Evaluation for Period 1-30 September 1952
TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry Regiment

SECTION I: STRENGTH
Strength as of 1 September 1952: 92.9% of T/O
Strength as of 30 September 1952: 98.8% of T/O
Strength of the Netherland Battalion attached: 44 offices, 61 EM.
KATUSA attached to Netherland troops: 195, KATUSA attached to the US troops: 456

SECTION II: ADMINISTRATIVE
During the period 1-30 September 1952 particular emphasis was placed on casualty reporting procedures. New casualty reporting forms were introduced to be used on a trial basis. This procedure was instituted by the Department of the Army. The purpose of the new forms was to simplify casualty reporting procedures and provide a rapid and accurage means for the individual soldier to report casualties. To facilitate causality reporting by attached UN troops, the casualty reporting forms were produced in Dutch and Korean. In addition, another type of casualty reporting form in simplified pamphlet form was received to be used on a trial basis. From the limited use of these forms it is believed that this system has somewhat simplified casualty reporting. After the attack on "Old Baldy" on 18 September, which resulted in over 400 casualties, the casualty reports in most cases were received accurately and promptly, indicating that the new casualty form is an improvement. The personnel Section, firmly established after its move from Chunchon, was able to provide much better service to the Regiment.
SECTION III: AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
The following awards and decorations were awarded or recommended during this period:
Distinguished Service Cross - 1
Silver Star - 11
Soldier's Medal - 10
Bronze Star (V) - 8
Bronze Star (M) - 30

SECTION IV: MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES

Morale during the above period was excellent. In that the Regiment was committed during the majority of the month, recreation facilities were considerably curtailed. There were a total of three USO shows shown to the troops during the month. Movies were made available to the reserve units on every other night basis. Mail delivery has been improved since the movement of the Regimental APO to the forward area. All units on line were issued 101 rations and an excellent supply of PX items, including many critical articles, were available to the troops. The Soldiers Deposit program was continually emphasized, and though the Regiment was on line, the results obtained during the month of September reached an all time high, $24,615 being deposited. The Regiment also contributed generously to the 2d Division Orphanage fund, I Corps Amputee fund, and the Army Emergency Relief. The Regimental Chaplains continued their policy of conducting frequent visits to the front line units in addition to holding regular Sunday services. During this period the Regiment received much publicity from both FECOM and ZI newspapers and magazines, particularly concerning the action on "Old Baldy", Porkcohp, combat outposts in the Regimental sector.

SECTION V: CASUALTIES
During the above period there were:
104 KIA
308 WIA
19 MIA
45 NBC

SECTION VI: REPLACEMENTS
A total of 451 enlisted replacements and 19 officer replacements were received during this period. Replacement flow and rotation was not normal during this period. The combat losses coupled with the small number of replacements received prevented the Regiment from rotating September eligibles, except ETS personnel, during the month. This affected 109 enlisted men; whom, although they had the necessary constructive months credit, were unable to rotate. Although this procedure is not conductive to a high state of morale, it was necessary to hold these eligibles in order to maintain the combat efficiency of the Regiment. Training of replacements was conducted by the Regimental Training Center in seven-day cycles. During their cycle of training, trainees were addressed by the Regimental Commander, Regimental Executive Officer, Regimental Chaplain, TI&E Officer, and the American Red Cross representative. The policy of instilling in them high esprit de corps is successfully continued.

PAUL R. WHEATON
Capt Infantry
Adjutant

S-2 MONTHLY SUMMARY
September 1952

1. During the period 01-30 September the 38th Infantry Regiment occupied positions on Line Jamestown.
2. A program of aggressive patroling was carried out with an average of 12 patrols dispatched for each 24 hour period. Contacts were made by patrols at the following points:
CT282354 CT256323
CT295358 CT267344
CT260336 CT294358
CT249317 CT257328
CT283355 CT295358
CT281346 CT275348
3. The enemy attacked positions on "Old Baldy" (CT256328) with one battalion supported by heavy artillery and mortar preparations at 1850 hours on 18 September. In this attack he succeeded in gaining his objective and remained there until driven off by friendly counter attack on 20 September.

4. At the same time, 1850 on 18 September, the enemy executed a secondary attack against positions on "Pork Chop" (CT269338) with a reinforced company, also supported by a very effective artillery and mortar preparation. In this attack he succeeded in gaining the crest of the hill, but withdrew apparently according to plan.
5. During the night of 2 September 52, an estimated enemy platoon succeeded in moving to the right flank position of "I" company on "Old Baldy" undetected. A few CCF entered the communication trenches capturing 1 Katusa and 1 US soldier after a brief fire fight. The US soldier succeeded in escaping while being dragged down the slope. The enemy covered their withdrawal with intense mortar fire.
6. Arty and Mortar Received:
Arty 3251 Rds
Mtr 7076 Rds
7. Enemy Losses:
PW_____________ 2
KIA - (counted)__ 86
KIA - (estimated) 293
WIA - (estimated) 610

WALTER H ROOT
Capt Inf
S-2

E. SUPPLY (LOGISTICS)

(Pages 1-8 of the Supply summary AWOL)

Evaluation
Headset, HS-30 1
Lantern, MX/290 GV 5
Microphone, T-45 14
Antenna, AN/130 19
Antenna, AN/131 14
Detector Set, SCR 625C 1
Reel, RL-39 1
Bag, BG-150 5
Compass, Lensatic 43
Maul, wood 1
Shovels, long handle 65
Picks, railroad 10
Mattock, pick 25
Board, plotting, M-10 1
Shovel, general purpose 15

7. Our three (3) "Surge Points" (Emergency Supply Points) are stocked with thirteen thousand, four hundred forty (13,440) "C" type rations and a two (2) day supply of ammunition for each of the three battalions on line. The shower point has been in operation throughout the period. A clothing exchange and barber shop located at the shower point, were put in operation during the period.

8. The total amount of Statement of Charges for the period is One Hundred Ninety-Five dollars and forty-two cents ($195.42), a decrease of Two Hundred Eight dollars and eighty-four cents ($208.84) under the total for the preceding period.

9. During the period the Fire unit repair shop repaired twenty-two (22) fire units for the regiment. Twenty-seven (27) fire units were turned in to Quartermaster for salvage or repair, of which twenty-seven (27) were repaired or replaced and returned to us.

10. Personal effects of thirty-four (34) persons were processed by the Graves Registration Section, also one-hundred eighty (180) bodies of which forty-one (41) were enemy dead, were evacuated during the period.

John O. Ensor
Capt Inf
S-4

HEADQUARTERS
1st Bn, 38th Infantry
APO 248
S-2 JOURNAL SUMMARY FOR SEPTEMBER 1952

During the period 01 Sept 52 to 05 Sept 52 the Bn remained in Regt res and cont work on res area.
On 6 Sept 52 the Bn rel the ND Bn and assumed responsibility of sector on Line Jamestown.
During period 6 Sept 1952 to 21 Sept 52 the Bn sent out 13 recon patrols and 13 ambush. During this period the patrols made 6 contacts and inflicted a total of 42 enemy KIA's counted; 113 est en KIA's; and 125 est en WIA's.
On night of 18 Sept 52 at approx 1830 the Bn began receiving heavy volumes of arty & mortar fire. At approx 1900 rs unkno. en attacked Porkchop OP and overran the psn. After overrunning the psn, the enemy pulled off because of the heavy casualties they suffered. The estimated enemy loses were not known.
Also on night of 18 Sept the en threw a Bn(+) sized atk on Baldy and captured it after fierce hand to hand fighting which lasted 10 hrs.
The night of 20 Sept 2d Bn, 38th Inf counter-attacked Baldy with G Co on left and F Co on right. After 9 hours of hand to hand fighting they retook the hill at 0630 hrs.
At 1600 hrs 21 Sept the 1st Bn was rel by 2d Bn, 9th Inf.
The morning of 22 Sept 52 the Bn rel the 2d Bn, 38th Inf and assumed responsibility of Baldy and sector of Line Jamestown.
From 22 Sept 52 to 30 Sept 52 the Bn sent out 16 screening ptls to cover the flanks and front of Baldy while wire teams laid wire around area. These screening patrols made 3 contacts with no est of en losses.
During the month the Bn received sporadic arty and mortar except for the 18 & 19 Sept when approx 3,500 rds fell on Bn. Total rds for the month of Sept on Bn sector was 5,264.
Various weapons, hand grenades, and documents were captured due to activity during month. All captured material was evacuated through S-2 channels.

HEADQUARTERS
1st Bn, 38th Infantry
APO 248
S-3 JOURNAL SUMMARY FOR SEPTEMBER 1952

1-2 Sept Bn was in Regt'l res & conducted tng.
3 Sept Bn stood a Command Inspection. Lt Col James B. Barrtholomees assumed command of Bn.
4 Sept Bn remained in Regt'l res & made prep to rel ND in sector of Line Jamestown.
5 Sept Bn began rel of ND and completed rel 6 Sept. New Bn CP set up vic 285319.
6 Sept thru 21 Sept Bn remained in sector of Line Jamestown & continued def.
On 18 Sept Bn was subjected to a terrific barrage of en arty & mortar fire. At 1845 hrs en atckd Porkchop outpost (1 plat B Co, CT268337) in an est atk of company size. Terrific fire fight ensued and en overran Porkchop onlt to be driven off by frdy arty, mortar, and AW fire. At 2337 hrs Bn CO led the Raider Platoon up Porkchop and reached top at 0012 hrs 19 Sept and secured Porkchop. He then ordered the reinforcement of Porkchop and evacuation of Frdy & en KIA's &WIA's. On 19 Sept from 1300 hrs to 1900 hrs A Co & Porkchop were again subjected to en arty barrage. Arty tapered off towards evening and sit remained quiet.
On 20 Sept est 30 en probed Porkchop and were driven back by arty & mortar fire after frdy forces had inflicted est 5 en KIA's and 10 en WIA's. In coordination with 2d Bn atk on Baldy which was secured by en on 18 Sept, A Co obsvd 250 en running frm Baldy and brought in AW and mortar and arty on en. Est 110 en KIA and 125 en WIA as a result of this action.
On 21 Sept 2d Bn, 9th Inf rel 1st Bn, 38th Inf in sector. Bn set up new Bn CP vic CT281313. Remainder of Bn remained in assy for 21 Sept after being rel 2d Bn, 9th Inf.
On 22 Sept A Co rel G Co & E Co of 2d Bn, 38th Inf on Baldy at 0600 hrs. D Co rec'd 1 KIA & 2 WIA from en shelling on Baldy 1917 hrs 22 Sept. Bn CO assumed responsibility of sector 23 Sept.
On 23 Sept C Co rel 2d RCN Co in Bn sector. Bn CO assumed responsibility of sector 1225 hrs 23 Sept. "I" Co remained in command of 1st Bn.
On 25 Sept D Co rel H Co in sector.
On 27 Sept K Co rel C Co in sector under control of 1st Bn.
On 28 Sept C Co rel A Co on Baldy; B Co rel I CO in sector.

S-3 JOURNAL SUMMARY FOR SEPTEMBER 1952 continued

En shelling during entire period was concentrated primarily on Porkchop and Baldy. With exception of 18-21 Sept en shelling was sporadic throughout entire period.
During period Bn was in sector of Line Jamestown (CT266323 to CT296328) Bn engaged in entensive repair & reconstruction work on psns concentrating mainly on Porkchop OP (CT268337).
During period Bn was in sector of Line Jamestown (CT266323 to CT253306) Bn engaged in extensive repair & reconstruction work on psns concentrating mainly on Baldy OP (256323)
At close of period Bn remained in sector of Line Jamestown (CT253306 to CT266323) and continued defense.
At close of period Bn sit was negative.

HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION
38TH INFANTRY
APO 248

4 OCTOBER 1952

SUBJECT: S-1 Monthly Unit Summary
TO: Commanding Officer
38th Infantry Regiment
APO 248, U.S. Army

1 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours followed by breakfast at 0630 hours, followed by police of area - Projector and sound equipment from 3d Bn turned into A&R Section Regiment by 1st Lt McDonald - 1 EM interviewed by Battalion Commander and assigned to Mike Company - Monthly reports finished and turned into message center for delivery to S-1 Regiment - Punishment Report - Rosters - Cadre Certificates - Corporal of the Guard woke Sgt Major 2300 hours stating that shots had been fired on Post #2 Sgt of the Guard with 2 reliefs sent to investigate, Capt Walker notified. Patrol sent to investigate listening posts set up for the remainder of the night.

2 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours followed by breakfast at 0630 hours, followed by police of area - normal routine of day followed

3 Sep - Reveille 030 hours followed by breakfast at 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - 1st Lt McDonald to A&R to find out about Post Exchange and setting up Battalion PX - 1 EM each from I, K, L, M Companies given clothing inspection by Sgt Major and sent to RTC Service Company in preparation for departure for NCO Academy departed S-1 1400 hours - Quota for R&R received from S-1 Regiment of 22 EM broken down as follows Hq 3, I 5, K 5, L 5, M 4, physicals to be taken 1300 hours 5 September 1952 departure 6 September 1952 - King, Krystal, Pfc, US54059184, Hq Co, to clearing - Burns, Clarence D, Cpl, US52001682, Co L, insect sting, to collecting and returned to duty - Steward John E, Pfc, US53097990, Co I grenade fragments, head, right hand blown off, NBC died of wounds in Battalion Aid Station - Lt McDonald, to S-1 Regiment to escort Lt Detweiler to 3d Battalion, assigned to King Company arrived 2000 hours

4 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours followed by breakfast at 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - 1 EM from I Company returned errouneously from NCO Academy sent back through RTC - Heckert, Cpl, I Company, US55145970, possible fracture of left foot concussion grenade to clearing - Lazier, Ralph, Sgt, I Company, RA11200087, WIA penetrating wound right upper arm abrasion back right knee to collecting - Woods, Hawatha, Pvt, RA13420446, penetrating wound left side to collecting - Southeland, James L, Pfc, Company King, US56129180, broken leg, head and neck, WIA - Kawaguchi, Kohei, Pvt, Company King, US56096543, fragments of right leg WIA - Hill, Leroy J., Cpl, L Company, US52125022, WIA right leg left shoulder - Legrand, William S., Pvt, Company I, RA144391114, leg and neck WIA - Hutcherson, Thomas E., Pfc, Company I, RA53077988, KIA, fragments both legs - Tapscott, Jack G., 1st Lt, 02211330, Company M, mortar fire, wounds of shoulders, chest, KIA - Flamm, Norbert J. Pfc, Company M, US55160623, Mortar fire left arm, chest, and shoulder.

5 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, police of area 0730 hours, negative report on Casualties this date 5 September 1952

6 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - picked up 5 replacements from RTC, 1800 hours and assigned as follows, 1 K, 1 L, and 3 M - one EM returned from Emergency leave reassigned to King Company - 1 Officer assigned to I Company.

7 Sep - 5 EM 1 each from Hq, I, K, L, and M companies sent to S-1 Regiment to witness drawing of NCO Raffle departed 0700 hours - 3d Bn, NCO Counsel met with the following companies represented Hq, I, K, L, and M companies, and Sgt Major presiding as chariman, Major Friedenwald representing Bn Commander - Ballek, William, Cpl, US52101318, Hq Co, shell fragment wounds back of right thigh, to clearing - Gutche, Glenway, Pvt, RA16394671, Hq Co. shell fragments of left lower arm, right thigh, returned to duty - Bach, Frederick, Pvt, RA21921582, Mike Company, WIA, contused wound left shoulder and left jaw to collecting - Barz, William, Cpl, US55516223, I Company, WIA, perforating wound right lower cervical region, to collecting - Whipple, Howard, 1st Lt, 01340725, I Company, WIA, left scapular region and right side, to collecting - Braun Walter C., Sgt, RA1637179, I Company, WIA, penetrating would right forearm, back to duty - Maynard, Roy L, Pfc, US53107607, I Company, WIA slight left cervical region wound, to collecting - Sifuentes, Daniel, Pfc, RA18372881, Hq Co, KIA, mutilated right arm, both legs - Bak Sing Ha, Cpl, K1138879, Company I, WIA, penetrating wound, lower lumbar region to collecting - Woods, Herman, Pvt, RA12337421, Company I, penetrating wound left side, throat, right hand, to collecting - Martin, Thomas L., 2nd Lt. 0990137, Company I, mortar wound right foot, to collecting - Ramarez, Elias Diaz, Pvt, US50112748, Company I, WIA, penetrating wound right buttock, returned to duty - Ou Meng Ju, Cpl, K1128106, Company I, WIA, small of back, wound of right arm, possible fracture of right thigh, to collecting - Canter, Rex F., Pvt, RA13357867, Company I, WIA, penetrating wound right thigh and right arm, to collecting - Morrision, William Pvt, US20910831, Company I, WIA, penetrating wound upper and lower arm, to collecting - Bartian, William, Pfc, US51132192, Company I, WIA, penetrating wound right side of nose to duty - Kyung Soo Kim, Pfc, K0693270, Company I, WIA, penetrating wounds left hand left buttock to collecting - Bowles, Charles, Pfc, US52131143, Hq Co., WIA, wounds of lower legs and right scrotum right hand, to 8055 MASH* - Bowman, Jack C., Pvt, US55204966, Hq Co., WIA, wounds of right arm and left eye to collecting - Toros, Diaz, Pvt, US50113108, Hq Co., combat exhaustion to collecting

8 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - 4 EM 1 each from I, K, L, and M companies from NCO Academy - 22 EM departed from S-1 3d Bn, for Service Company, going on R&R 1100 hours furnished one meal prior to departure - 1 officer, 1 WOJG departed on R&R from S-1 3d Battalion to Service Company 1100 hours

9 Sept - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours, and general police of supply area - Serman, Joseph I, Pvt, US52132477, Company L, WIA, left thigh to collecting - 2 EM from RTC to 3d Battalion picked up 1400 hours assigned to Battalio - 1 2nd Lt,, assigned to Battalion - Regimental and Battalion Sgt Majors held meeting at S-1 Regiment 1500 hours, meeting was NCO Council reading of final report on recent NCO Raffle and profit also how money was divided. $2661.00 taken in, $492.75 paid out for purchase of prizes., balance of $2168.25 was divided as follows: $1084.00 to Officers council and $1084.25 to NCO Council.

10 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, police of area 0730 hours - 1 EM King Company, departed on Big R, ETS, departed 0700 hours to S-1 Regiment - 1 EM departed to S-1 Regiment to make compassionate telephone Call to ZI departed 000 hours - 2 EM love Company reported back through RTC from Hospital - 3 EM given clothing and equipment inspection by Bn Sgt Major and then sent to RTC fro further shipment to NCO Academy, departed 1530 hours.

11 Sep - Reveill 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, police of area, 0730 hours - Cushman, James E, Cpl, RA11171562, Company King, slight multiple wounds in back of head and right shoulder to clearing - Dickison, Ray E. Pvt, RA17316673, Company King, penetrating wounds side of face, neck, to clearing - 3 ROKs WIA sent to clearing.

12 Sep - Fry, Richard, Pvt, RA13411847, WIA, slight wound right upper and lower leg to clearing - Todderdale, Robert, 2nd Lt., 02205753, Company L., WIA,, slight penetrating wound left wrist incised wound left leg, to clearing - #No. of EM WIA, 3, from L Company, sent to clearing - 1 EM from I Company WIA, sent to clearing.

13 Sep - Reveille, 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, police of area, 0730 hours, general police of supply area - 1 Officer and 1 EM each from Hq, K, L, and M departed for winterization school to be held at Division forward at chaplain tent departed 0700 hours - 1 EM departed from S-1 3d Bn to Regiment for records check - 8 EM arrived in Battalion 1900 hours, for assignment within the Battalion, interviewed by 1st Lt McDonald - List from Regimental S-1 on R&R for Officers - 22 EM scheduled for R&R - Wilson, Robert, Pfc, US52128058, Company K, partial amputation of right lower arm, slight fracture of left lower leg, tp 8055 MASH - Sutherlan, Raymond, Pfc, US55196810, K Company, penetrating wound of left thigh, back of left knee to clearing

14 Sep - 1 ROK sent to 38th personnel on Emergency leave - 8 EM replacements interviewed by Lt Col., Fogle, and assigned to their respective companies - Elmes, Howard C., Pvt, RA13282262, Company M, SFW of face, chest, right thigh, KIA

15 Sep - 2 EM returned from NCO Academy - 2 EM returned from 8th Army Honor Guard - 1 EM returned from 2nd Division 2nd Replacement Company - 3 EM and 1 Officer returned from R&R - 2 EM from I Company WIA sent to clearing - 1 EM from K Company WIA, sent to clearing - 1 EM from love Company WIA, sent to clearing.

16 Sep - 15 EM to Regiment S-1 to be placed on Mandatory Levy - 1 EM ROK sent to Regiment S-1 for Emergency leave - Schnitski, Gilbert, Sgt, RA16333829, I Company, jaw infection NBC to collecting - 2 EM from I Company WIA, sent to clearing - 1 EM from Mike company seriously wounded in action, sent to 8055 MASH - 2 EM from L Company sent to clearing

17 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - normal routine carried out.

18 Sep - 16 EM replacements interviewed by Battalion Commander Lt Col Fogle and turned over to respective companies and taken to positions on hill - 22 EM and 1 Officer departed for R&R 1100 hours - Trains area alerted 1900 hours - attack on Baldy - 1 EM sent to Battalion Aid Station, 2 EM sent to forward Aid Station, 1 EM sent to collecting to obtain information regarding heavy casualty rate

19 Sep - Information coming in very incomplete as to number of casualties actually occurred - total casualties as of 19 September, 60 WIA, 4 WIA Officers, 3 KIM EM, 8 WIA ROK EM, 1 KIA ROK EM, reported as of 1800 hours -50 EM 1 WOJG reported into trains area from positions on hill - 1st Lt McDonald reorganizing remnants of L, and K Companies to determin known number of KIA, WIA, and MIA

20 Sep - Work going forward with the reorganization of Love and King companies, supervised by 1st Lt McDonald - 23 EM arrived in 3d Battalion trains area 1845 hours replacements interviewed by Lt Col Fogle, and turned over to clerks to obtain necessary information - 3 EM departed on R&R, 1 each from I, K and L

21 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - 12 ROK soldiers brought from RTC to 3d Battalion and quartered for the night after interview with Battalion Commander - Captain Parr assigned to King Company as Battalion Commander, WOJG Jenkins assigned to King Company as Unit Adminsitrator - Lt Col Fogle interviewed WOJG Jenkins

22 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - 2 trucks dispatched to forward Aid Station to bring back blocking force - 11 EM received from RYC - Lt Col Fogle interviewed 11 replacements and subject EM turned over to respective clerks - 1 EM each from Hq, I, K, L, and M companies, interviewed by Battalion Commander, likely candidate to compete with other EM of various battalions and organizations fir a trip to Japan, candidate chosen, Pogue, Roy J, King Company, SFC - 3 EM going on R&R sent to Battalion Aid Station for dusting - 4 EM returned from NCO academy EM from King Company 2nd in class.

23 Sep - 1 EM from Love Company departed for Emergency leave 0800 hours - 3 EM departed S-1 3d Battalion for scheduled R&R - 6 Officer replacements for 3d Battalion received, interviewed by Battalion Commander, and assigned to respective companies - 1 EM, King Company, to collecting for physical prior to rotating - 1 ROK EM departed on emergency leave - 22 EM scheduled for R&R On 29 September 1952

24 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - normal routine carried out

25 Sep - Battalion to receive 44 EM replacements and 20 ROK EM at 1800 hours - 9 EM departed at 0400 hours for 2 day tour of Seoul Area - 44 EM replacements and 20 ROK EM received by Battalion and interviewed by Battalion Commander, turned over to respective companies - 44 EM replacements taken to respective companies.

26 Sep Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, followed by police of area 0730 hours - general routine of day carried out.

27 Sep - S-1 tent taken down, finished breaking camp and loading equipment and departed Blue Trains area 0915 hours. Arrived in new Battalion area 1000 hours and finished setting up S-1 equipment 1145 hours - 9 EM returned from Seoul area tour.

28 Sep - Reveille 0530 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, police of area 0730 hours - 4 EM departed for Jewish High Services at 0830 hours - 2 Officer replacements arrived, interviewed by Lt Col Fogle

29 Sep - Reveille 0630 hours, breakfast 0645 hours, followed by police of area 0715 hours - 3 EM returned from NCO Academy, EM from King Company stood 1st in class - 1 EM returned from clearing for duty to L company

30 Sep - Reveille 0600 hours, breakfast 0630 hours, following police of area 0715 hours - Pay Agents departed from S-1 for finance office 0900 hours - Pay Agents commenced paying personnel 1330 hours.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

JOHN W. McDONALD
Capt, Infantry
Adjutant

SECURITY INFORMATION

Hq 3rd Bn, 38 Inf
MAK KOL (CT311282) KOREA
5 Oct 52

MONTHLY S-2 JOURNAL SUMMARY FOR SEPTEMBER 1952

Period Covered: From 0118001 Sep 52
To 3018001 Sep 52

The greater portion of the period was spent in active defense of the same positions the Battalion was defending in August. The Battalion continued an agressive policy, dispatching a minimum of two patrols each night.

Item Co had a small force on HILL 180 continually; their mission being to observe surrounding terrain for suspected enemy positions and movement.

An Observation Post on HILL 287 was manned by six men of the Bn I and R Section. They spotted and reported enemy activity on HILLS 222, 204, 228, and 228.9, thereby facilitating the laying of effective fire from organic and supporting weapons on these areas. An enemy Observation Post on HILL 204 was rendered useless to the Chinese by the destructive fire of the 50 cal MG to the rear of the Battalion OP. The same MG harrassed CCF moving through commo trenches; many "possible hits" were reported.

In addition, the Battalion OP assisted in reporting the location and caliber of incoming enemy mortar and artillery rounds. By taking sound and flash azimuths to the active enemy weapons they were able to call for and adjust effective counterfire upon them.

Patrolling was the main offensive effort; patrols set up ambushes at points where enemy activity had been spotted in a vain attempt to capture a PsW. Two contact patrols accomplished their mission admirably; one inflicted upwards of 15 enemy KIA and an untold number of enemy WIA, the other resecuring the left flank of HILL 266 (Baldy) and holding until attacking force passed through them. The latter patrol was instrumental in winning back HILL 266 with a minimum of casualties and material. Areas patrolled most frequently in the attempt to capture a prisoner were HILL 190 at CT253316, HILL 192 at CT250317, the SIDAMAK VALLEY via CT249322, and the open ground North of HILL 266, vic CT246337.

Enemy mortar and artillery fire showed a marked increase on 15 Sep, and continued an upward climb; main target areas being HILL 266 and Easy Check Point. At 1850 hours 18 Sep HILL 266 received an unprecedented TOT; fifteen minutes later the enemy launched a vicious Battalion sizes attack, ignoring the devastating fire of supporting weapons and their own artillery barrages which they ran through. The enemy secured HILL 266 and held until the night of 20 Sep, when the 2nd Bn attacked and recaptured the vital outpost during the morning hours.

The 3rd Bn was relieved by the 1st Bn on 23 Sep at 1155 hours, and moved into reserve at Mak kol shortly afterward.

OFL:
STIEBER
Acting S-2

 

[CtahhR]

The summary for the effective strength and casualties for the 21st September show just how hard a time the 38th had experienced.

The 3rd Battalion in which Morrison served (Item Company, 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division) suffered the following casualties on the 21st;

17 KIA and 13 WIA. Leaving a strength of 24 Officers and 633 Enlisted. A total of 348 KIA, 1525 WIA and 484 MIA since being deployed in Korea.

 

More detailed listings shows from Item Company;

1st Lt Thomas Martin
M/Sgt James Adams
Sgt Gilbert Schnitski
PFC Samuel George

Wounded In Action on 21st September.

 

Item Company suffered no additional casualties on 22nd September.

The summary for casualties on 22nd September shows 1 KIA in the 3rd Battalion.

 

[CtahhR]

General Orders #45 of the Headquarters Of The Department Of The Army, 28th August 1957. The paperwork must have been misplaced for almost 5 years.

V. BRONZE STAR MEDAL. 1. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order 9419, 4 February 1944, A Bronze Star Medal with "V" device for heroic achievement in connection with military operations against an enemy of the United States is awarded to the following-named enlisted men:

Sergeant Harvey D. Brown, (then Corporal), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism on 19 September 1952 near Chorwon, Korea. An attack on a hill by Sergeant Brown's Company was stopped by concentrated enemy machine gun fire. In an effort to silence the enemy guns, Sergeant Brown voluntarily exposed himself in order to reach a 3.5 rocket launcher which had been disabled by enemy fire. He removed the defective part and with complete disregard of enemy fire and the danger involved in using only the rear half of the launcher, placed such accurate fire on the enemy machine guns that they were put out of action. Sergeant Brown's heroic action reflects great credit on himself and is in keeping with the traditions of the military service.

Private Francis R. Decker, Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Sang Mago Ri, Korea, on 18 September 1952. When an enemy attack threatened to overrun his position, Private Decker exposed himself not only to enemy fire but also to friendly artillery fire in order to more effectively throw hand grenades on the flanks. Private Decker's voluntary and courageous action prevented the enemy from surrounding the position and permitted an orderly withdrawal. Private Decker's action was an inspiration to his comrades and reflects great credit on himself and the military service.

Sergeant Robert E. Feichter, (then Corporal), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroic achievement near Chorwon, Korea, 16-24 August 1952. During heavy fighting on the hill, "Old Baldy," casualties were numerous and medical personnel were few. When the Company was ordered to withdraw, Sergeant Feichter remained behind in order to tend the wounded. Despite concentrated enemy mortar and artillery fire and though separated from his organization, he continued his ministrations. The courage and devotion to duty displayed by Sergeant Feichter reduced the severity of casualties, reflecting great credit on himself and the military service.

 

Corporal Joseph E. Garren, (then Private First Class), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Sang Mago Ri, Korea, on 19 September 1952. When it became apparent that a patrol pinned down by enemy fire was in danger of suffering severe casualties because of inability to provide covering fire, Corporal Garren gathered several weapons and took a position on the forward slope of the hill. From that exposed position he was able to return enemy fire with such effectiveness that the trapped patrol was able to withdraw to friendly lines, bringing wounded with them. The courageous action of Corporal Garren in drawing enemy fire on himself in order to aid his comrades reflects great credit on him and the military service.

Sergeant First Class Enrique C. Gonzales, (then Private First Class), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Inje, Korea, on 27 May 1951. While directing an attack from the forward slope of a small rise, the company commander was seriously wounded. Without regard to his own safety, Sergeant Gonzales left the protection of his covered position and ran approximately 50 yards through intense enemy small arms fire to bring his commander to safety. The prompt and courageous action of Sergeant Gonzales reflects great credit on himself and is in keeping with the high traditions of the military service.

Private First Class Harvey H. McCulley, Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Chorwon Korea, on 18 September 1952. During an enemy attack on the position held by Company K, Private McCulley was manning a light machine gun. As the fighting became more intense and the enemy infiltrated other sections of the line, Private McCulley moved to an exposed position in order to direct his fire more effectively. After firing 30 boxes of ammunition his gun was destroyed by a grenade. Despite serious wounds from that hit, Private McCulley continued to engage the enemy with grenades until all ammunition was exhausted. Private McCulley's heroism and devotion to duty denied the enemy important advances, reflecting great credit on himself and the military service.

Private First Class William J. Morrison, (then Private), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Chorwon, Korea, on 18-19 September 1952. During an attack on the hill "Old Baldy," Private Morrison's company was pinned down by intense enemy small arms fire. Without regard for his own safety Private Morrison volunteered to return across approximately 200 yards of open terrain to deliver a message and obtain reinforcements. The courage and devotion to duty displayed by Private Morrison reflect great credit on himself and the military service.

Corporal Robert D. Reim, Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism in Korea, on 13 September 1952. While on a patrol on the hill known as "Old Baldy," Corporal Reim's group encountered an enemy ambush and suffered numerous casualties. When the patrol was ordered to withdraw, Corporal Reim voluntarily remained behind throwing hand grenades to such effect that the enemy was frustrated in his attempt to cut off the group and the wounded could be safely evacuated. Corporal Reim's courage and devotion to duty reflect great credit on himself and are in keeping with the traditions of the military service.

Sergeant First Class Donald J. Schwartz, (then Sergeant), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Chorwon, Korea, on 19 September 1952. During withdrawal from Hill 266, Sergeant Schwartz' company came under heavy enemy fire and suffered numerous casualties. After carrying one wounded soldier down the hill to safety, Sergeant Schwartz returned to the crest and rescued another. Despite his exposed position, he remained to assist in caring for other wounded and assuring their evacuation. Sergeant Schwartz' courage and devotion to duty reflect great credit on himself and are in keeping with the high traditions of the military service.

Private First Class John J. Perkins, (then Corporal), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Chagun-Gol, Korea, on 20 September 1952. Private Perkins was a member of a combat patrol charged with seizing and holding forward positions until a counterattack by other elements of the regiment could be launched. Despite intense enemy artillery and small arms fire, the objectives were seized. When information was received that an air strike was to be made close to the occupied bunkers, Private Perkins volunteered to inform the balance of the patrol. Delivery of the message involved movement through enemy fire over terrain which offered little or no cover. As he was leaving the trench a mortar shell exploded about 4 feet away, subjecting Private Perkins to severe concussion. On a second attempt Private Perkins suffered another concussion under similar circumstances. When the counterattacking elements passed through, the patrol returned to its assembly area where Private Perkins refused evacuation until he had reorganized the patrol and assured medical attention to the wounded. The heroism and devotion to duty demonstrated by Private Perkins reflect great credit on himself and the military service.

2. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order 9419, 4 February 1944, a Bronze Star Medal with "V" device (first Oak Leaf Cluster) for heroic achievement in connection with military operations against an enemy of the United States is awarded to the following-named officer and enlisted man:

Master Sergeant John W. Williamson, (then Corporal), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Sang Mago Ri, Korea, on 18 September 1952. On his first day in combat, Sergeant Williamson was subjected to an intense enemy attack. He manned a heavy machine gun in an advanced position until his weapon was destroyed by a hand grenade. In the subsequent withdrawal, Sergeant Williamson continued to engage the enemy with his carbine and side arm. The outstanding bravery and effectiveness of Sergeant Williamson in his baptism of fire reflect great credit on himself and the military service.

Captain Walter A. Klein, (then First Lieutenant), Infantry, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism on "Old Baldy" Hill, Korea, on 19 September 1952. Given the mission of taking an important point on the hill and holding it until reinforcements could be brought up, Captain Klein began the assault across terrain under excellent enemy observation. When effective enemy small arms fire inflicted numerous casualties and threatened to repulse the action, Captain Klein encouraged his men and led them to the crest of the hill. When finally forced to withdraw by overwhelming numbers, Captain Klein assured that all wounded were evacuated before he sought safety. The courage and leadership displayed by Captain Klein reflect great credit on himself and the military service.

3. By direction of the President, under the provisions of Executive Order 9419, 4 February 1944, a Bronze Star Medal with "V" device (second Oak Leaf Cluster) for heroic achievement in connection with military operations against an enemy of the United States is awarded to the following-named officer:

Captain Stephen F. Dodd, (then Second Lieutenant), Finance Corps, United States Army, distinguished himself by heroism near Taegu, Korea, on 14 September 1950. While serving as an artillery forward observer for "G" Company, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, which was defending Hill 570, vital terrain feature north of Taegu, South Korea, Captain Dodd's unit became engaged in a violent struggle for Hill 570. Captain Dodd, with complete disregard for his own life, continually exposed himself to intensive enemy small arm, mortar, and artillery fire. At the height of a savage attack as the issue hung in balance, Captain Dodd with great gallantry braved a heavy hail of enemy fire, and raced 200 yards across a forward slope in full view of enemy attackers. The enemy assault was finally thrown back, due in large part to Captain Dodd's efforts. When enemy-held ground was later recaptured, the large number of enemy dead attributed to artillery fire proved the effectiveness of Captain Dodd's action. His decisive and valorous action, unflinching courage under fire, and unswerving devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflect great credit on himself and the United States Army.

 

 

[CtahhR]

Now knowing the action that lead to the award, the day's events can be looked in to.

I've found the 3rd Battalion's S-2's Journal for 1800 hours on 18th to 1800 hours on the 19th.

I Company are mentioned in messages:

1900 3, Co I: receiving "a lot" of incoming rounds. Will call back giving details.
1905 5, Co I: Request PC carrier.
2026 37, Co I: Green flare on HILL 266
2055 46, Lt Brubaker: Line to Love Co out. Main line is now through Item Co.
2211 64, Switchboard: One line to Item Co down.
2225 68, OP: Flare plane dropping flares over Co I and HILL 347
2250 71, OP: One illuminating grenade in right platoon of Co I.

There is no more reports on or from Item Company - It is very likely communication was completely cut giving someone the need "to return across approximately 200 yards of open terrain to deliver a message and obtain reinforcements".

 

[CtahhR]

To look at the day's actions from a slightly different perspective there is also the S-3 Journal.

1830 1, Tank Co going to take Tk (abandon) from MLR by Item Co. Item Co notified.
1855 2, Capt Johnson called - Item Co is receiving a lot of arty fire. Col Fogle notified.
1910 4, Wire Commo is out to Baldy
1925 11, Baldy wants VT to keep coming. Item Co is giving all support to Baldy.
2120 54, Men on 180 will stay.
0602 179, Man come out of CP Bunker and reported they are digging in. (Is this Morrison?)
0955 232, Major Friedenwald notified Capt Johnson, I Co. Capt Johnson reported situation negative and secure. (Notified Col Fogle)

At 1855 hrs, 18 Sep 52, I Co reported receiving intense enemy mortar fire - Immediately following King Co, holding defensive psns on Baldy received a TOT.

At 1910 hrs wire commo to Baldy was out. A radio message received reported the enemy to be on top of Baldy, engaging the friendly psn in a small arms fire fire. Baldy requested help. Col Fogle ordered a close defensive near Baldy. Love and Item Co's were notified to give all possible fire support. Col Fogle also request immediate assistance from a reserve Co.

 

Also a page from the next day's journal.

1835 3, Lt Gearhart called from M Co mortars; has fifty men from I & K Co, will send them by truck to Hq Co for chow.

After a day on the defensive I Company's strength was 132 EM and 4 Officers present for duty with 1 KIA and 4 WIA.

 

I also found the 38th Infantry Regiment's S-2's Journal Summaries for 19-20 and 20-21 September.

At 0530 Hrs (20th) I Co Ptl I Co Deptd Easy checkpoint for Baldy. Plat occupied 1st 5 bunkers on left slope of Baldy, receiving sporatic mortar fire and S/A fire.

 

I also found the 38th Infantry Regiment's S-3's Journal covering 1600 hours 18th September to 1710 hours 19th September. Although there is no mention of Item Company in does emphasise the complete collapse in communications during the attack.

 

 

[CtahhR]

I was also lucky enough to find the 38th Infantry Regiment Headquarters Periodic Intelligence Reports for the period.

 

1800 17th to 1800 18th - Just before the push by Chinese forces.

"1106 rounds falling in forward positions".

 

1800 18th to 1800 19th.

"On Baldy, unknown number of enemy (probably 2 companies) assaulted under intense artillery, mortar, RR rifle, and tank fire preparation (1000 rds mixed), and overran positions" - Certainly not a situation conducive to running 200 yards in open terrain.

 

1800 19th to 1800 20th.

"Item Co Patrol reached left platoon positions on HILL 266. Patrol held up by enemy fire, engaged in brief firefight. Patrol returned to frdly positions 0610. Same patrol moved to same positions at 0800, receiving approximately 500 rounds mixed artillery and mortar en route. Patrol occupies 5 bunkers on "Old Baldy" as Period ends." - Still wouldn't like to take a 200 yard walk.

 

 

[CtahhR]

The situation returned to one similar to that prior the battle as this 16th October 1952 aerial photograph and October positions chart show.

 

[CtahhR]

Here is a cutting from 29th September 1952 Brooklyn Eagle reporting his wound. By this time it was rather old news as the wounded Private had been recommended for the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device.

 

[CtahhR]

PFC William James Morrison, 10th May 1931 - 5th September 1996.

WILLIAM JAMES MORRISON
Funeral Services for William James Morrison, 65, of Crossville, who passed away Sept. 5, 1996, were conducted 10 a.m. Monday, Sept. 9 from St. Alphonsus Catholic Church. Father Michael Roark officiated.
Mr. Morrison was born May 10, 1931 in New York. He was a member of the St. Alphonsus Catholic Church and a Lifetime member of D.A.V.
Survivors include his wife, Louise Morrison of Crossville; sons, William J. Morrison III of Crossville, Joseph P. Morrison of Paramus, N.J., and Guy F. Morrison of Marietta, Ga.; daughters, Lisa Morrison of Hackensack, N.J., and Diane P. Ennesser of Pine Bush, N.Y.; brother, John Morrison of Freehold, N.J.; sisters, Patricia Morrison of Manhattan, N.Y. and Carolyn Netherby of Stratton Island, N.Y., and one grandchild. Burris Funeral Home was in charge of the arrangements.

He was buried at Crossville City Cemetery, Tennessee. This was obtained in Tennessee so all the story ties in very well.

 

[CtahhR]

The location of the action. Not a billion miles away from a Gregory Peck film....

[Captainofthe7th]

Very nice medal and tremendous research (and transcribing). One of the most interesting things, to me, at least, is all of the awards for Old Baldy in the DA GOs. For the heck of it I looked for Morrison in the 2d Division General Orders, and of course he didn't show up, but I had to look. So, great detective work on your part. I might have passed on this having not been able to find him in the divisional orders.

 

Thanks for sharing! I am very fond of the Bronze Stars for heroism like this.

 

Rob